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COMMENTS
THE LIQUIDATION-REINCORPORATION DEVICE -
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress has determined that dividend distributions of a corporation
will receive ordinary income treatment for tax purposes' while distribu-
tions in complete liquidation of a corporation will be taxed at capital
gains rates.2 This determination has provided the impetus for taxpayers
to devise complex transactions designed to "bail-out" the earnings and
profits3 of a corporation at capital gains rates while still continuing the
business as a going concern.4 One device which has been successfully
employed by taxpayers under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is what
is known in common tax parlance as a liquidation-reincorporation. 5
Basically, a corporation will liquidate and distribute cash and operating
1. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 301 (c) (1). This subsection incorporates by refer-
ence section 316 which, when read in conjunction with section 301, provides that a
distribution to a shareholder with respect to his stock shall constitute a dividend to
the extent of the distributing corporation's accumulated or current earnings and
profits. If a distribution exceeds these amounts, section 301(c)(2) calls for the
excess to be offset against the basis of the shareholder's stock. If the basis is reduced
to zero, section 301 (c) (3) provides for the excess to be treated as a capital gain.
2. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 331 (a) (1), provides that "[a]mounts distributed
[to shareholders] in complete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in full
payment in exchange for the stock." With the liquidation characterized as an exchange,
sections 1221 through 1223 then provides for the distribution to receive capital
gains treatment.
3. "Earnings and profits" is a statutory term of art employed in section 316
of the Code to designate an amount of "surplus" in a corporation which, when dis-
tributed to shareholders with respect to their stock, will constitute a dividend subject
to ordinary income treatment. It is somewhat anomalous that the Code does not define
the term. Moreover, there does not seem to be a counterpart in state corporate law.
B. BITTKER & J. EusTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OP CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS § 5.03, at 152 (2d ed. 1966).
4. A preferred stock bail-out is another device which achieves this result.
Although section 306 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 has, to a large extent,
prevented this method of tax avoidance, it still has some vitality. See, e.g., Alexander
Landis, Bail-Outs and the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 65 YALE L.J. 909 (1956) ;
Solomon, How To Deal With Section 306, U. So. CAL. 1968 TAX INST. 1967; Wolf-
berg, Uses of Preferred Stock in Tax Planning for Closely Held Corporations, 44
TAXES 52 (1966).
5. For general discussions of this problem, see Hewitt, Liquidations v. Rein-
corporations and Reorganizations: The Current Battle, 15TH ANNUAL TUL. TAX
INST. 187 (1965) ; Kuhn, Liquidation and Reincorporations Under the 1954 Code,
51 Gxo. L.J. 96 (1962) ; Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have the Ground Rules
Really Changedf, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1218 (1964) ; Margolin, Corporate Liquidation
and Subsequent Incorporation: Reorganization?, 42 TAXES 464 (1964); Morrison,
The Line Between Liquidations and Reorganizations, 41 TAXES 785 (1963) ; Nicholson,
Recent Developments in the Reincorporation Area, 19 TAX L. REV. 123 (1964);
Rice, When is a Liquidation Not a Liquidation for Federal Income Tax Purposes?,
8 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1956) ; Schwartz, Reincorporations Under the 1954 Code,
15. U. FLA. L. REv. 159 (1962) ; Whitaker, Liquidation and Reincorporation, U. So.
CAL. 1966 TAX INST. 191.
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assets to its shareholders who in turn will retain the cash and transfer
the operating assets to a second corporation which they control. This
transaction will result in the taxation of the earnings and profits of the
liquidated corporation at capital gains rates rather than at ordinary in-
come rates and will enable the business to continue under the samre
ownership and management. Though fully within the letter of the Code,
such transactions represent a method of tax avoidance which clearly
violates the intended operation of the Code sections employed to effec-
tuate these transactions.6
This Comment will discuss the methods used to achieve a liquidation-
reincorporation and the arguments which the Commissioner has urged
under the 1954 and pre-1954 Internal Revenue Codes in seeking to dis-
allow the benefits of these transactions. In addition, a format for the
solution of this problem will be posited and compared with prior statutory
proposals designed to eliminate the effectiveness of a liquidation-reincor-
poration.
II. HISTORY
Prior to the 1954 Code changes, liquidation-reincorporations did not
constitute a serious problem. The Commissioner was able to "shoe-horn"
a substantial number of these transactions into the very flexible language
of the pre-1954 Code dealing with corporate reorganizations. Though
these Code sections were not designed for the reincorporation trans-
actions, the courts were able, through the use of judicially developed
concepts, to implement the policy behind the reorganization section and
thereby nullify any tax avoidance schemes. 7
The principal weapon of the Commissioner at this point in time was
the "D" type reorganization, defined as "a transfer by a corporation of
all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after
the transfer the transferor or its shareholders or both are in control
of the corporation to which the assets are transferred." The word "con-
trol" in this definition was defined in section 112 (h) and required that
the shareholders of the transferor corporation own at least "80 per centum
of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to
vote and at least 80 per centum of the total number of shares of all
other classes of stock of the corporation."
6. See p. 460 infra for a discussion of the policy underlying section 331
dealing with complete liquidations.
7. For an excellent discussion of the statutory and non-statutory corporate
reorganization requirements under the pre-1954 Code, see Hewitt, Liquidations v.
Reincorporations, 15TH ANNUAL TUL. TAX INST. 187, 189-215 (1965).
8. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112 (g) (1) (D), 53 Stat. 870 (now INT. Riv.
CoDn of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (D)). The pre-1954 Code definition of a "D" reorganiza-
tion did not change since its adoption in 1924.
9. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(h), 53 Stat. 40 (now INTr. R9v. CODE
of 1954, § 368(c)). The requirement of control under the pre-1954 Revenue Act was
construed to be essential for finding a "D" reorganization. See p. 431 infra.
[VOL. 14
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When the requirements of a "D" type reorganization could arguably
be established, the consequences to the shareholders of the corporations
involved would be two-fold. First, section 112 (b) (3)10 of the Code
provided that no gain or loss would be recognized by the shareholders
of the transferor if stock or securities of the transferor were exchanged,
pursuant to a plan of reorganization," for stock or securities in the
transferee corporation. 12 Second, if other property was received in addi-
tion to stock or securities of the transferee corporation, a reorganization
could still take place under section 112 (c) (1), 13 but such other prop-
erty could be recognized as income by the shareholders of the transferor
if, in fact, gain was realized on the exchange. The gain, however, could
not be recognized in excess of the sum of the cash and the fair market
value of the other property received. If section 112 (c) (1) was ap-
plicable, section 112 (c) (2) 1 4 provided that the gain recognized should
be taxed as a dividend if the distribution had the effect of a dividend.15
Therefore, the effect of finding a "D" reorganization in a reincorpora-
tion transaction was that a distribution in liquidation of a corporation
would not receive capital gains treatment, 6 but would be taxed as a
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(b) (3), 53 Stat. 37 (now INT. Rv. CoDE
of 1954, § 354(a) (1)).
11. The Commissioner viewed the requirement of a plan of reorganization literally.
Treas. Reg. 103, § 29.112(g)-6(a) (1952), stated that the "plan of reorganization
must be adopted by each of the corporations parties thereto; and the adoption must
be shown by the acts of its duly constituted responsible officers, and appear upon the
official records of the corporation." A split of authority developed, however, with
respect to this requirement. The Sixth Circuit followed the view of the Service and
required the adoption of a formal plan of reorganization. United States v. Arcade Co.,
203 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953). Other circuit courts
ignored the fact that there was no formal plan of reorganization when confronted
with a reincorporation case. Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 231
F.2d 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 836 (1956), aff'g 23 T.C. 196 (1954)
Becher v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955), affg 22 T.C. 932 (1954)
Heller v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1945), aff'g 2 T.C. 371 (1943).
These courts generally reasoned that an informal plan of reorganization could be
established on the facts of a reincorporation case and held this sufficient to satisfy
the requirement.
For a discussion of the technical requirements of a "D" reorganization under
the 1954 Revenue Act, see p. 440 infra.
12. See p. 428 infra for a more complete discussion.
13. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(c) (1), 53 Stat. 39 (now INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 356(a) (1)).
14. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(c) (2), 53 Stat. 39 (now INT. REv. COnE
of 1954, § 356(a) (2)). See p. 458 infra for an in-depth discussion of section 356(a) (1)
and (2).
15. It was generally considered under the pre-1954 Code that "boot" distributions
pursuant to a reorganization would receive automatic dividend treatment to the extent
of the distributing corporation's earnings and profits. See Commissioner v. Bedford's
Estate, 325 U.S. 283 (1945). However, cases decided under the 1954 Code question
this result. See Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Idaho
Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl. 1958) ; William H. Bateman,
40 T.C. 408 (1963). One authority believes that the language in section 356(a) (2) -
"has the effect of a distribution of a dividend" - is not as static as most think.
B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS § 12.34, at 593 (2d ed. 1966), feel that this phrase permits each shareholder's
"boot" distribution to be analyzed to determine if it should be given dividend treat-
ment or redemption treatment pursuant to section 302(b) or section 346(a) (2).
16. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 115(c), 53 Stat. 46 (now INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 331).
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dividend under section 112 (c) (2) and receive ordinary income treat-
ment.17 The obvious result would be that an attempted tax saving would
result in an enormous tax burden.18
The cases prior to the adoption of the 1954 Code concerning liquida-
tion-reincorporation can be placed for the purposes of analysis in three
separate classifications according to the method employed to achieve the
desired result. The first of these - pre-incorporation followed by a
liquidation - presented the least problem for the Service. Generally, a
typical situation would be that corporation A with substantial earnings
and profits,19 would form a second corporation, corporation B, and trans-
fer A's operating assets to B in exchange for the common stock of B.
A, thus in possession of liquid assets and the stock of B, would then
resolve to liquidate and distribute the stock and liquid assets to its share-
holders.20  B would then carry on the same business as A, with the
same ownership and management, except in a different corporate form.
17. In addition to treating the "boot" distribution of the liquidating company
as ordinary income, finding a reorganization under the pre-1954 Code had other
consequences. First, section 112(b)(4), 53 Stat. 37 (now INT. Rev. CODE of 1954,§ 361), provided that the transferor corporation recognized no gain on the exchange
of its property for stock or securities in the transferee. Secondly, section 113(a) (7),
53 Stat. 41-42 (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 362), called for the tax basis of the
transferor's assets to carryover to the transferee.
Under the present code, section 381 sets forth a comprehensive scheme for the
carryover of corporate attributes, when a reorganization occurs. For a detailed dis-
cussion of this section, see B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICr, FDERAL INcOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS §§ 13.10-.43, at 615-708 (2d ed. 1966).
18. To illustrate this point under the 1954 code, assume that corporation A has
a single shareholder who holds his stock at a basis of $100,000. Corporation A then
transfers its operating assets to corporation B in return for all of B's stock valued
at $100,000. A then resolves to liquidate and distributes B's stock on liquidation and
cash of $200,000 to its shareholder. Assuming the shareholder has no other income,
if the distribution was found to be a valid liquidation pursuant to section 331(a),
capital gains tax would be imposed on $200,000 ($200,000 earnings and profits plus$100,000 of B corporation stock minus $100,000 basis of A's stock). Section 1201(b)
then imposes the following tax on the capital gains: one-half of the recognized gain($100,000) at ordinary rates plus 25 percent of the excess ($100,000). The tax bill
on this amount, employing section 1(a) of the Code, would be $84,340.
However, if a reorganization was found, section 354 would allow corporation
B's stock to be exchanged with out recognition of gain. The $200,000 would be taxedpursuant to sections 356(a) (1) and (2). If this distribution is found to have the effect
of a dividend and assuming that corporation A has sufficient earnings and profits, the
amount of the tax at ordinary income rates would be $135,840.
19. Another provision of the Code, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 102, 53 Stat. 35(now INT. Rpv. CODE of 1954, § 531) may have prompted taxpayers to effectuate a
reincorporation. It provided for a tax to be levied on the net income of any corpora-
tion, if the corporation was "availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition
of the surtax upon its shareholders or the shareholders of any other corporation,
through the medium of permitting earnings or profits to accumulate instead of beingdivided or distributed." The tax was 25 percent of the undistributed net income notin excess of $100,000 and 35 percent of the net income in excess of $100,000. Rather
than have this tax imposed, a corporation would attempt a reincorporation with a
view to having the earnings and profits taxed at capital gains rates.
20. E.g., Becher v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955), aff'g 22 T.C. 932(1954) Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949), aff'g 10 T.C. 1080(1948) Love v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1940), aff'g 39 B.T.A. 172(1939) Ethel K. Lesser, 26 T.C. 306 (1956) ; Austin Transit, Inc., 20 T.C. 849(1953) Estate of Elise W. Hill, 10 T.C. 1090 (1948); Morley Cypress Trust,
Schedule "B", 3 T.C. 84 (1944) ; Hortense A. Menefee, 46 B.T.A. 865 (1942).
[VOL. 14
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The Service found little difficulty in finding that this type of trans-
action came within the literal language of the "D" reorganization. 21
There was in these cases a transfer of assets by a corporation to another
corporation and the transferor was in control of the transferee immedi-
ately after the transfer. Although in most cases no formal plan of
reorganization existed, the courts were able to find informal plans which
they held sufficient to afford the transaction reorganization treatment.22
The only factor which did not fit the reorganization scheme was the
liquidation of the transferor. Arguably it was a transaction separate
from the reorganization which entitled it to be taxed as a capital gain
rather than as ordinary income. However, the courts found the liquida-
tion incident to the reorganization since the entire plan would be fruitless
without the transferor's liquidation. 23
The second type of transaction - sale of assets followed by a liqui-
dation - proved more difficult to justify under the literal requirements
of a "D" reorganization. However, through application of the "step
transaction" concept,2 4 the Commissioner was successful in employing
the "D" definition to thwart an earnings bail-out. Basically, the share-
holders of one corporation, corporation A, would form a second corpora-
tion, corporation B, with a minimum of capital. B would then purchase
the operating assets of A for cash and continue the same business. Cor-
poration A would then completely liquidate and distribute its earnings
and profits at capital gains rates. 25 This device was more attractive than
the pre-incorporation-liquidation scheme previously discussed. In addi-
tion to bailing out the earnings at capital gains rates, a new basis would
21. In Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (lst Cir. 1949), the court stated
that Congress intended the reorganization sections to cover a reincorporation since
"the essence of a statutory reorganization is a continuance of the proprietary interests
in the continuing enterprise under modified corporate form, the transaction being
deemed insufficiently closed economically to justify a tax at the time, except in so far
as the stockholder gets something in addition to stock or securities in the reorganized
company." Id. at 648, quoting Darrell, The Scope of the Commissioner v. Bedford
Estate, 24 TAxzs 266, 272 (1946). In Estate of Elise W. Hill, 10 T.C. 1090 (1948),
the Tax Court found that a reincorporation fell within the "letter" and "spirit" of
the "D" reorganization even though only 44 percent of the assets of the disappearing
corporation were transferred to a continuing enterprise in exchange for its stock
or securities. Id. at 1094.
22. Hortense A. Menefee, 46 B.T.A. 865, 868 (1942). See also note 11 supra.
For a discussion of this requirement under the 1954 Code, see p. 440 infra.
The reasoning which the courts employed to reach this conclusion is best
exemplified by a quote from William M. Liddon, 22 T.C. 1220 (1954):
Even though there was no formal written plan, the various transactions - the
sale of Davis's stock, the formation of a new corporation, the transfer of assets
from the old to the new corporation, the liquidation of the old corporation after
the new corporation was in business - all indicate a master plan of reorganiza-
tion rather than the mere liquidation of the old corporation.
Id. at 1225.
23. Becher v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 252, 254 (2d Cir. 1955), aff'g 22 T.C. 932
(1954) ; Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 649 (1st Cir. 1949), aff'g 10 T.C.
1080 (1948) ; Estate of Elise W. Hill, 10 T.C. 1090, 1096 (1948) ; Morley Cypress
Trust, Schedule "B", 3 T.C. 84, 86 (1944).
24. For a complete discussion of the "step-transaction" doctrine, see p. 443 infro.
25. E.g., Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 836 (1956), aff'g 23 T.C. 196 (1954) ; Liddon v. Commissioner,
230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956), rev'g on other grounds,
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be attributed to the property, in the amount of its actual cost to the
transferee.20  Under the first method the assets were exchanged for stock
and the basis in the hands of the transferee would be the same as the
basis in the hands of the transferor.27 Therefore, if the market value of
the property was in excess of the transferor's basis the assets would be
placed on the transferee's books at a stepped-up rate, thereby enabling
the same business, in a different corporate form to "re-depreciate" the
same assets.
28
In this second situation there was some difficulty in establishing a
"D" reorganization and the consequent dividend treatment 29 of the liqui-
dation resulted from the fact that there was no stock for stock exchange
as required by section 112 (b) (3). To the contrary, the stock of the
transferee was purchased for cash by the stockholders.30 This barrier
to the finding of a reorganization was overcome by the courts when
they analyzed these cases under the step-transaction doctrineA1 The
substance of this doctrine is that transactions leading to one result can-
not be viewed separately and independently for tax purposes but must
be considered together in order to arrive at the true nature of a particular
transactionf 2 By telescoping the transactions the courts found that the
22 T.C. 1220 (1954) ; Heller v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 868 (1945), aff'g 2 T.C. 371 (1943).
It should be noted that there was no counterpart in the 1939 Code to section
337 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, which provides that the gain from the sale
of assets by a corporation is not recognized if the corporation adopts a plan of
liquidation and completely liquidates within a 1-year period. Therefore, any gain
realized on the sale of assets would necessarily increase the amount of earnings and
profits and thereby increase the amount of the liquidating distribution which could
be tagged as a dividend if the sale of assets-liquidation was found to be a reorganiza-
tion. In order to evade this adverse effect of a sale of assets-liquidation, a corporation
would sell its assets at book value. E.g., Liddon v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304, 306
(6th Cir. 1956).
For an example of how earnings and profits are computed, see B. BITrxM
& L. EuSTICE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION Or CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
§ 503, at 152 (2d ed. 1966).
26. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 113(a), 53 Stat. 40 (now INT. Rev. CODE
of 1954, § 1012).
27. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 113(a) (6), 53 Stat. 41 (now INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 362).
28. Although the assets will still be carried on the transferee's books at cost,
the "recapture provisions" of the 1954 Code, sections 1245 and 1250, introduced in
1962, may minimize the tax advantages of this type of reincorporation.
29. For the purposes of discussion we are assuming that the "boot" portion of
the liquidating distribution has the effect of a dividend. As noted earlier, this may
not always be the case. See note 15 supra.
30. Generally, the shareholderes of the disappearing corporation would obtain a
bank loan which they would use to purchase the stock in the continuing business.
With this capital the entity would purchase the operating assets of the disappearing
corporation. When the liquidated company made its final distribution at least part of
the cash would be made up of these borrowed funds. For an example of the com-
plexity of these transactions, see Heller v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 376, 377-78 (9th
Cir. 1945).
31. See p. 443 infra for a complete discussion of this concept.
32. Liddon v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304, 309 (6th Cir. 1956) ; Heller v. Com-
missioner, 147 F.2d 376, 378 (9th Cir. 1945).
In Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942), the
Supreme Court sanctioned the use of the step-transaction doctrine when it stated
that "[tiransitory phases of an arrangement frequently are disregarded under these
[reorganization] sections of the revenue acts where they add nothing of substance to
the completed affair." Id. at 184-85.
[VOL. 14
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1969], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/4
SPRING 1969]
literal definition of a "D" reorganization was met since what took place
was a transfer of assets by a corporation, albeit by sale, to another cor-
poration which was controlled by the transferor's shareholders immedi-
ately after the transfer. The payment of cash for the transferee's stock
was immaterial to finding a reorganization because the same amount of
cash was eventually returned to the shareholders upon liquidation of
the transferor.33  Although some courts merely ignored the fact that
there was no stock for stock exchange,3 4 others reasoned that since the
shareholders 6f the disappearing corporation were in control of the
new corporation the net effect was that an exchange took place.3 5 This
method of analysis may be justified by the fact that section 112 (b) (3)
did not define a "D" reorganization, but rather prescribed the conse-
quences of a stock for stock exchange when it occurred pursuant to
any type of reorganization. It may be concluded, therefore, that such an
exchange was not a prerequisite to the finding of a "D" reorganization
under the pre-1954 Code.36
The final device, a liquidation followed by a reincorporation, was
probably the least complex, yet proved to be the nemesis of the Com-
missioner under the pre-1954 Code. Corporation A would liquidate and
distribute its operating assets in kind (usually held in trust) and its
liquid assets to its shareholders. The former stockholders of corpora-
tion A would then form corporation B and transfer the former operating
assets of A to B3 7 in exchange for B's stock, retaining for themselves
33. See note 30 supra. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Liddon
v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1956), found, however, that to the extent of
any personal contribution to the capital of the new company by the taxpayer, the
liquidating distribution of the disappearing corporation could not have the effect of a
dividend since "its effect was the repayment of an advance." Id. at 309.
34. E.g., Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C. 371 (1943).
35. Liddon v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304, 307 (6th Cir. 1956).
36. This is supported by the Third Circuit's opinion in Commissioner v. Morgan,
288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1961), rev'g 33 T.C. 30 (1959). There, a mutual fund had
separate contracts with the transferor company for investment advisory services and
with the transferee for the promotion of the fund's securities. The latter two corpora-
tions were commonly controlled by the taxpayer and, in 1952, for the purpose of
improving their efficiency, the transferee brought both service organizations under
one corporate veil. The contract of the transferor company was terminated and the
mutual fund contracted immediately thereafter for the same services from the trans-
feree. In addition, equipment and employees of the transferor were passed to the
transferee. The transferor was then liquidated and the Commissioner alleged that
these transactions constituted a "D" reorganization denominating the liquidating
distribution as a dividend to the extent of earnings and profits. The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court and found a "D" reorganization absent
a stock for stock exchange reasoning that the issuance of new stock would have been
a "meaningless gesture" since the taxpayer already controlled both companies.
Under the 1954 Code a stock for stock exchange is seemingly necessary
before a reorganization is found since section 368(a) (1) (D) incorporates by refer-
ence section 354 which requires such an exchange. For a discussion of this require-
ment under the 1954 Code, see p. 440 infra.
37. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(b) (5), 53 Stat. 37 (now INT. Riv. CODE
of 1954, § 351), provided that "[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized if property is
transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or
securities in such corporation, and immediately after the exchange such person or
persons are in control of the corporation . .. ."
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the liquid assets of A .3 Difficulty in finding a "D" reorganization arose
because the assets were transferred by the former stockholders and not
by the corporation, as the definition of a "D" reorganization required. 39
At least two circuits40 required strict compliance with the definitional re-
quirements of a "D" reorganization and reasoned that once the old cor-
poration liquidated, the shareholders were under no legal obligation to
transfer the assets to a second corporation. Without some legal duty on
the former shareholders the Sixth Circuit felt that the liquidation of A
and subsequent transfer to B should be afforded separate tax treatment
and could not be telescoped to arrive at a reorganization. 41 Other cir-
cuits, confronted with the same factual situation, gave greater weight
to the spirit of the reorganization sections rather than their literal lan-
guage and employed the step-transaction doctrine to find a "D" reorgani-
zation, based on the reasoning that the former shareholders acted as a
mere conduit through which the operating assets passed from the trans-
feror to the newly formed transferee corporation. 42
Prior to the 1954 Code, therefore, the Commissioner could generally
utilize the definition of a "D" reorganization as an effective
way to thwart these tax avoidance schemes. However, the problem with
analyzing these transactions under that definition, or any of the reorgani-
zation definitions, lies in the fact that they were not intended for this
purpose. According to one commentator the purpose of the reorganiza-
tion sections
was to facilitate changes in corporate structure, dictated by business
needs but not involving substantial economic transfers to third par-
ties or withdrawals from corporate solution, so as to prevent the
fossilization of business forms which would occur if all corporate
adjustments of such a nature were subject to tax.43
They were drafted then for the benefit of the taxpayers and not for
the Commissioner. Although it has been seen that the Tax Court and
the circuit courts of appeal were, for the most part, successful in expand-
ing the meaning of the "D" type reorganization without doing violence
to it, this was not always possible. For example, in Austin Transit, Inc.44
the owners of one company liquidated and transferred all the assets to
38. E.g., Bard-Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 906 (1955) ; United States v. Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953); Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th
Cir. 1947), aff'g 5 T.C. 665 (1945) ; Hendricksen v. Braicks, 137 F.2d 632 (9th
Cir. 1943).
39. See p. 424 supra for the definition of a "D" reorganization.
40. United States v. Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
828 (1953) ; Hendricksen v. Braicks, 137 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1943).
41. United States v. Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 828 (1953) ; Hendrickson v. Braicks, 137 F.2d 632, 635 (9th Cir. 1943).
42. Bard-Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 906 (1955) ; Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753, 755 (8th
Cir. 1947).
43. Hewitt, Liquidations v. Reincorporations and Reorganizations: The Current
Battle, 15TH ANNUAL TUL. TAX INST. 187, 193 (1965).
44. 20 T.C. 849 (1953).
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three new companies. However, the prior owners of the liquidated cor-
poration only owned 70 percent of the stock of the new companies. The
Tax Court held that the 80 percent control test of section 112 (h) was
an essential requirement without which a reorganization could not take
place.45 Taxpayers, therefore, could effectuate a liquidation-reincorpo-
ration without the threat of having the transaction being "shoe-horned"
into a "D" reorganization if they were willing to relinquish 21 percent
or more of the common stock of the transferee company.
III. THE 1954 CODE
A. History
The House version of the 1954 Code initially contained a section
specifically directed at the liquidation-reincorporation transaction. 46 The
section was, however, deleted and the Joint Committee report gave the
following explanation for the deletion:
The possibility of tax avoidance in this area is not sufficiently
serious to require special statutory provision. It is believed that this
possibility can appropriately be disposed of by judicial decision or
by regulation within the framework of the other provisions of the
bills.4
7
The Commissioner accepted the invitation of the Joint Committee
and thereafter promulgated Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1 (1)48 and Treas.
Reg. § 1.331-1 (c) 49 in an effort to prevent what was viewed as an
earnings bail-out. 50 Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1 (c) provides that a liquida-
tion which is either preceded or followed by a reincorporation "of all
or part of the assets of the liquidating corporation may, however, have
the effect of the distribution of a dividend or of a transaction in which
no loss is recognized and gain is recognized only to the extent of 'other
property.' See sections 301 and 356."11 This language appears to indi-
cate that if the reincorporation transaction is not found to be a reor-
ganization under section 368,52 thereby bringing into operation section
356,53 then the distributions upon liquidation may have the effect of a
dividend under section 301.54 In effect, the regulation ignores the fact
45. Id. at 856.
46. For a discussion of this Code section, see pp. 452-56 infra.
47. H.R. ReP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954) (emphasis added).
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(1) (1955).
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1(c) (1955).
50. See pp. 426-31 supra explaining how an earnings bail-out is accomplished.
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1(c) (1955).
52. INT. Rgv. CODs of 1954, § 368. Section 368 defines a reorganization for the
purposes of the non-recognition treatment accorded such a transaction under INT. REv.
COD8 of 1954, § 354.
53. INr. Riv. CoDe of 1954, § 356. For a more complete discussion of the
mechanics of applying section 356, see pp. 457-58 infra.
54. INT. Rgv. CODE of 1954, § 301. A distribution falling within section 301 will
be given ordinary income treatment to the extent of the distributing corporation's
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of liquidation and treats the distribution as a redemption of stock not-
withstanding its failure to refer to section 302.r5 However, once Treas.
Reg. § 1.301-1 (1) is examined it is apparent that the references to sec-
tions 301 and 356 in Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1 (c) are not to be read as
mutually exclusive of each other. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1 (1) provides
that:
A distribution to shareholders with respect to their stock is within
the terms of section 301 although it takes place at the same time
as another transaction if the distribution is in substance a separate
transaction whether or not connected in a formal sense. This is
most likely to occur in the case of a recapitalization, a reincorpora-
tion or a merger of a corporation with a newly organized corporation
having substantially no property.56
This language clearly indicated that the Commissioner was ready to take
the position that distributions to shareholders in a reincorporation trans-
action would be treated as a dividend under section 301 notwithstanding
the fact that it might be a "D" type, "E" type or "F" type 57 reorganiza-
tion and that section 356 would not control the extent and character of
the shareholder's gain upon liquidation. It may appear at this juncture
that whether or not the reincorporation transaction was a reorganization
would be immaterial since any distributions in such a transaction would
be treated as a section 301 dividend. However, it would still be neces-
sary for the Service to take the position that a reincorporation trans-
action was a reorganization in order to bring into operation sections 36258
and 38159 providing for the carryover of basis for capital assets and
other tax attributes of the disappearing corporation. This, in itself,
places the Service in an anomalous position in that when it argues that
the liquidation transaction is a reorganization it thereby brings into
operation section 356 which specifically provides for the treatment of
"boot" in a reorganization transaction. The Service must then either
ignore or argue against the application of section 356 - which is directly
tied to the reorganization provisions 60 - in favor of section 301 treat-
ment for the property, other than section 354 property, which is received
by the shareholders on liquidation. The inconsistency of this position
earnings and profits. But see pp. 447-48 infra: J.E. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d
874 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'g in part and rev'g in part South Texas Rice Warehouse Co.,
43 T.C. 540 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1966).
55. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 302. Subsection (b) provides that where a redemp-
tion of stock has the effect of a dividend it will be treated as such under section 301.
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(1) (1955) (emphasis added).
57. INT. Rzv. CODE of 1954, §§ 368(a) (1) (D), (E), (F). In Joseph C. Gallagher,
39 T.C. 144 (1962), acquiesced in result only, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 5, the Commissioner
clearly advocated this approach. See also J.E. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 879
(5th Cir. 1966), aff'g in part and rev'g in part South Texas Rice Warehouse Co.,
43 T.C. 540 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
58. INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 362.
59. INT. R4v. CODE of 1954, § 381.
60. See pp. 434-35 infra.
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has been criticized by numerous authors6 and has found little or no
support in the cases decided under the 1954 code.62
The Service, however, has persisted in its stand as evidenced by
Rev. Rul. 61-156.63 The situation presented by that revenue ruling is
that of a corporation, which, upon adoption of a plan of complete liqui-
dation under section 337,64 sold substantially all of its assets to another
corporation which was recently formed by the management of the sell-
ing corporation in exchange for stock, long term notes, and cash. The
new, purchasing, corporation immediately thereafter sold 55 percent of
its stock to the public, thereby diluting the interest of all of the old corpora-
tion's shareholders receiving stock in the new corporation to 45 percent.
The question presented was whether the distribution in liquidation of
the former corporation was pursuant to a plan of reorganization under
section 368 or was to be treated in accordance with the provisions of
sections 331 O5 and 337 pertaining to corporate liquidations. The Service
ruled that a reorganization had occurred within the meaning of sections
368 (a) (1) (E) or (F) notwithstanding the fact that 55 percent of
the stock of the purchasing corporation was owned by persons other
than those who held shares in the liquidating corporation. Furthermore,
it was held that the cash and notes distributed as part of the liquidation
constituted a dividend within the purview of section 301. With respect
to the application of section 301 to the "boot" received, the Commis-
sioner felt that it was not part of the consideration for the stock trans-
ferred pursuant to the reorganization but was a separate distribution
having the effect of a dividend under section 301.
From this ruling it appears that the Service will take the position
that the typical reincorporation transaction must be segregated into
separate and distinct transactions. Those parts of the total transaction
which are to be split off as separate and distinct would be those creating
a proprietary interest in others and the distribution of liquid assets to
the shareholders of the disappearing corporation. Whether the receipt
61. E.g., Hewitt, Liquidations v. Reincorporations and Reorganizations: The
Current Battle, 15TH ANNUAL TUL. TAX INST. 187, 231-35 (1965) ; Lipkind, Gallagher
Revisited: The Functionally Unrelated Corporate Reorganization, 13 VILL. L. Rev.
487, 517-20 (1968); Rice, When is A Liquidation Not a Liquidation For Federal
Income Tax Purposes, 8 STAN. L. REv. 208, 225-28 (1956).
62. See, e.g., Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acquiesced in result only,
1964-2 Cum. BULL. 5.
63. 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 62. This ruling revoked the Service's prior "Baseball
ruling," Rev. Rul. 56-541, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 189, which stated that where 80 percent
of the stockholders of the old corporation owned 45 percent of the stock of the new
corporation, there was no reorganization and that the distribution in liquidation was
not subject to dividend treatment.
64. INT. REv. CODs of 1954, § 337. Generally, section 337 provides for the non-
recognition of gain or loss at the corporate level when a corporation adopts a plan
of complete liquidation to be carried out within one year.
65. INT. REv. CODg of 1954, § 331. Section 331 provides that distributions in
complete liquidations shall not be taxed in accordance with the rules of section 301.
As to partial liquidations, see INT. Rgv. CODE of 1954, § 346.
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of the boot and changes in proprietary interests can be separated from
the reorganization transaction has not gone unquestioned. 6
One criticism of this position can be made on the basis that when
the Joint Conference Committee made reference to "other provisions of
the bill" it had in mind the sections of the 1939 Code dealing with the
reincorporation transactions and the manner in which they were ap-
plied by the courts.6 7 The general weapon used, as noted previously,
was the finding of a reorganization under section 112 (g) (1) (D) and
the treatment of boot under section 112 (c) (1) and (2) of the 1939
Code. It should be noted that in the revenue ruling no mention of sub-
section (D) of section 368 (a) (1) is made.61 Instead, the Commis-
sioner found that either an "E" or "F" type reorganization had oc-
curred. From this, an argument could be made against the position of
the Service in the revenue ruling on the basis that sections 368 (a) (1)
(E) and (F) and section 301 were not intended by Congress to meet
the reincorporation problem, but rather the transaction was to be sub-
jected to "D" type reorganization treatment as was done under the 1939
Code. However, considerable doubt existed as to whether the Com-
missioner could achieve the same results under the 1954 Code in light
of the various changes in the wording of what constituted a "D" type
reorganization.
B. "D" Type Reorganiz-ation
As now defined in section 368 (a) (1), a "D" type reorganization
requires that: (1) the disappearing corporation transfer all or a part of
its assets to another corporation; (2) the surviving corporation be con-
trolled by the transferor or one or more of its shareholders; (3) stock
or securities of the transferor corporation are distributed pursuant to
a plan of reorganization; and (4) the transaction qualifies under section
354, 355, or 356. The major changes in the definition of a "D" type
reorganization arise from adding the requirements that stock or securi-
ties of the transferor corporation be distributed pursuant to a plan and
the references made to sections 354, 355, and 356.
The most important aspect of the changes made are the references
to sections 354, 355, and 356. These referrals were apparently necessary
in order to include the section 355 "divisive reorganization" within the
definition of a "D" type reorganization. However, section 3550 does
not apply in that in the reincorporation transaction one business rather
than two flows from the reorganization as contemplated by section 355.
66. See pp. 443-44 infra. Compare Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d
125 (5th Cir. 1966), rev'g in part, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379 (1965), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1018 (1966) with Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acquiesced in
result only, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 5.
67. See pp. 424-31 supra.
68. This is probably because of the numerous statutory requirements of finding
a "D" reorganization. See pp. 436-43 infra.
69. INT. Rzv. CODX of 1954, § 355.
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Therefore, for the purposes of determining whether a reincorporation
transaction qualifies as a "D" type reorganization it becomes necessary
to determine if the transaction qualifies under either section 354 or 356
or both.
Upon examination of section 356 it is clear that it will only serve
to qualify a transaction which would otherwise qualify under section
354 or 355 but for the receipt of "boot" as part of the reorganization.
Therefore, it is clear that qualifying under section 354 becomes one of
the most crucial steps in the road to finding a "D" reorganization.
Generally, section 354 provides for the non-recognition of a gain
or loss in a transaction where "stock or securities in a corporation a
party to a reorganization are . . . exchanged solely for stock or securities
. . . in another corporation a party to the reorganization."70 However,
subsection (b) qualifies this general non-recognition provision by pro-
viding that non-recognition shall not apply to a "D" type reorganization
unless: "(A) the corporation to which the assets are transferred acquires
substantially all of the assets of the transferor of such assets .... -71 From
this language it becomes clear that in order to have a "D" type reorgani-
zation which qualifies under section 354, "substantially all" the assets
of the transferor corporation must be transferred to the transferee cor-
poration notwithstanding the language in section 368 (a) (1) (D) re-
ferring to the transfer of "all or part" of the transferor's assets. 72 This
particular requirement of a "D" reorganization has caused the greatest
amount of controversy as to how it would affect pre-1954 Code decisions
dealing with the reincorporation transaction. As will be seen, this
change in language along with the other change previously mentioned,
has not, to any great degree, changed results which might have been
obtained by applying the provisions governing the "D" reorganization
in the 1939 Code. 73 What has developed to be more of a problem is
the characterization of the reincorporation transaction as an "F" type
reorganization rather than the "D" type. However, at this juncture the
examination of the reincorporation transaction under subsection (D) will
continue and consideration of subsection (F) will be deferred to a later
point.74
70. INT. Rtv. CODE of 1954, § 354(a).
71. INT. REv. CoDn of 1954, § 354(b) (1) (A) (emphasis added).
72. This difference in wording probably arises from the fact that section 355
divisive reorganizations are also covered by section 368(a) (1) (D). Thus the "D"
definition had to be worded broadly enough to cover the divisive type and section
354 reorganization.
73. See pp. 426-31 supra.
74. See pp. 446-52 infra.
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1. The Requirement of "Substantially All"
The decision of the Tax Court in John G. Moffatt75 was the first
time that a court dealt directly with the issue of the meaning of "sub-
stantially all" the assets as used in section 354(b) (1) (A). The position
which the court took on this issue is probably best expressed by a quote
which in part came from the Southland Ice Co. 70 case. The court in Moffatt
stated: "And finally, it must be remembered that the 'substantially all'
requirement has been subjected to [a] construction which in effect ap-
plies a continuity test rather than mere blind percentages." 7 The test
of continuity referred to by the court is one which requires that "[i]n
one form or another the new company has the use and benefit of all the
assets relating to the operation of the business, [by the successor cor-
poration] whether by 'loans,' 'rentals' of equipment followed ultimately
by sale thereof, or otherwise." 78
In the Moffatt case, the Tax Court was faced with the liquidation
of an engineering consulting firm where land was distributed to the
shareholders but was not either leased, sold, or otherwise transferred to
the new corporation. The cost of this land represented a significant
portion of the assets found in the balance sheet of the liquidating cor-
poration. However, because the land was not necessary to the continued
operation of the consulting business its transfer was not considered in
determining whether the liquidating corporation transferred "substan-
tially all" its assets. The Tax Court found that the staff of skilled
employees was more significant in relation to the operation of a con-
sulting business and found that by virtue of the transfer of all the
employees to the payroll of the new corporation and the transfer of
cash and other furniture and fixtures to the new corporation, that "sub-
stantially all" of the operating assets, within the purview of section 354
(b) (1) (A), had been transferred to the new corporation.
At this point it would seem clear that the Tax Court would not
rely solely on the schedule of balance sheet assets and liabilities to deter-
mine whether "substantially all" the assets79 have been transferred. The
operations of the surviving corporation will be scrutinized to determine
the degree of continuity in the operation of its business with that of the
business of the predecessor. Thus, such items as the loss of good will
due to a change in name, or losses of key personnel, as well as the
transfer of outstanding contracts or work on such contracts, and any
75. 42 T.C. 558 (1964), aff'd, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386U.S. 1016 (1967). See also Retail Properties, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1463(1964) ; Ralph C. Wilson, Sr., 46 T.C. 334 (1966).
76. 5 T.C. 842 (1945).
77. 42 T.C. at 578.
78. Id. at 579.
79. But see J. Jay Rommer, 268 F. Supp. 740 (D.N.J. 1966), where the court
said that percentages of assets transferred may be relevant. It may appear that the
court will look to the percentage transferred in relation to "operating assets." How-
ever, the test is more one of continuity than "blind percentages," although such a per-
centage test in relation to operating assets may prove to be a valuable rule of thumb.
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other changes in the operating assets which might give the surviving
corporation the appearance of a new business appear to be of importance
in determining whether "substantially all" the assets were transferred.
In other words, one must examine and decide the extent of the carry-
over of all the attributes of the liquidating corporation to the new cor-
poration and place values on each item relative to its importance to the
continuation of the business of the disappearing corporation. After this
is accomplished, then one must determine whether "substantially all"
the attributes of the liquidating corporation appear in the new corpora-
tion. If the answer is affirmative, then the "substantially all" requirement
of section 354 (b) (1) (A) will have been met.80
Indicative of the approach taken by the Tax Court is the James
Armour, Inc.81 case. In Armour, the transferor had assets with a fair
market value of about $1,230,000. Of this amount only $620,774.98 (rep-
resenting construction equipment owned by transferor) and $7802.84
(which represented the value of furniture, fixtures, and automobiles)
were transferred to the surviving corporation. A building having a value
of $109,030.00 and a lease from the sole shareholder of each corporation
having a book value of $70,410.4682 were not transferred to the succes-
sor corporation but were distributed to the shareholders who thereafter
leased the property to the successor corporation. 88  The Tax Court in
finding that "substantially all" the assets were transferred within the
meaning of section 354(b) (1) (A) stated: "Thus, it will be seen that
as a result of the transactions Excavating [successor corporation] either
acquired title to, or the use of, all the assets essential to the conduct of
the business enterprise. '8 4 It should be noted that the Tax Court was
not concerned with whether title to "substantially all" the necessary op-
erating properties were transferred to the successor corporation. The
Tax Court reviewed the operations of the successor corporation with
a view to determining whether essentially the same business was being
conducted with essentially the same facilities immediately after the liqui-
dation and reincorporation as was conducted before that transaction. The
Tax Court, therefore, in determining whether a transfer of "substan-
tially all" the assets has occurred within the meaning of section 354 (b)
(1) (A) will rest its decision upon the transfer of the use of the prop-
erty rather than the transfer of both title and use.
80. Notably, the courts says that the test of "substantially all" depends on the
facts of each case. In Estate of Bernard H. Stauffer, 48 T.C. 277 (1967), rev'd, 403
F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968), the Tax Court found a "D" reorganization notwithstanding
its finding that there had been a substantial change in the business via the merger
of three viable corporations. Thus, the concept of continuity does not mean that the
business need exist in the identical manner as it did before the reorganization, but
that its presence be clearly discernable in the new corporation. See also James
Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964).
81. 43 T.C. 295 (1964).
82. The balance of approximately $425,000 was made up of cash and receivables
used to pay creditors or distributed as part of the liquidation.
83. Id. at 309.
84. Id. at 309.
COMMENTS
15
Lombardo and Riley: The Liquidation-Reincorporation Device - Analysis and Proposed So
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
As a result of these two cases, it appears that "transfer" as used
in section 354 (b) (1) (A) refers to the transfer of use as well as',
both title and use and that "substantially all" the assets refers mainly
to operating assets.
It may be questioned whether these interpretations can be sustained
on the basis that section 354 (b) (1) (A) merely presents a test of con-
tinuity and is therefore not to be literally interpreted. The case of J.
Jay Rommer v. United States5 represents an apt example of how the
broad interpretation given to "substantially all" by the Tax Court could
result in an inequitable use of the reorganization sections. In Rommer,
as part of a plan of liquidation under section 337, the corporation sold
a luxury apartment house (its only operating asset) in an arm's length
transaction for approximately $412,000 in cash and a tenement house with
an equity value of $40,000. A short time later, two of the three share-
holders in the corporation formed a new corporation to which the tene-
ment house was transferred. The balance of the assets were distributed
to the shareholders pursuant to section 337. The Service assessed the
stockholders for a deficiency stating that a liquidation-reincorporation
had occurred and that the transfer of the tenement house to the new
corporation constituted a "D" type reorganization within sections 354 (a)
(1) and 368(a) (1) (D). It was clear that immediately preceding the
transfer the only operating asset held by the liquidating corporation
was the tenement house and that that asset was reincorporated. There-
fore, it was argued that substantially all the assets were transferred
and the business carried on before the transfer (the rental business)
was being carried on afterwards by the successor corporation. If this
position was accepted then the obvious result would be that section 337
would not apply to the original sale 6 and that section 356 would neces-
sarily control the income characterization of the property received and
retained by the shareholders.
The district court refused to accept the Service's approach and
held that the initial sale of the luxury apartment to an outsider, in
essence, terminated the business of the liquidating corporation and that
the subsequent transfer of the tenement house was one of the several
steps in the plan of liquidation under section 337 and was to be treated
as such.87 The court answered the Service's argument that "substan-
tially all" the assets were transferred within the meaning of section
354(b) (1) (A) in that the only operating assets, namely the tenement
house, was transferred to the new corporation by stating: "To view this
conveyance as a transfer of 'substantially all' [the] assets, borders on the
frivolous."88
85. 268 F. Supp. 740 (D.N.J. 1966).
86. See pp. 439-40 infra, where the cases of Retail Properties, Inc., 23 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1463 (1964), and Ralph C. Wilson Sr., 46 T.C. 334 (1966), are discussed.
87. 268 F. Supp. at 745.
88. Id. at 744.
[VOL. 14
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1969], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/4
SPRING 1969]
The obvious error in the Service's position was the failure to group
all those factors which were part of the single overall plan of the corpo-
ration under one roof. Thus, the Service improperly excluded from con-
sideration the initial sale of the luxury apartment, the rental of which
constituted the business of the corporation immediately preceding the
series of transactions in question. Once it is established that the liquidat-
ing corporation was in the business of renting a luxury apartment and
that the new corporation was in the business of renting a tenement
house then it is quite clear that the transaction, viewed as a whole,
lacked the continuity which formed the heart of the Tax Court's interpre-
tation of "substantially all" in Moffatt and Armour. This case is indicative
of one of the pitfalls arising from the Tax Court's interpretation of "sub-
stantially all." There are, as of now, no clear standards to guide the
taxpayer in determining what factors should or should not be considered,
and thus, the predictability of treatment of any given set of facts is
lacking. s9
Another problem related to the "substantially all" test arises from
the possible effect of finding a "D" type reorganization on sales of prop-
erty to outsiders by the corporation in reliance upon the non-recognition
provisions of section 337. To illustrate, the facts in the Retail Proper-
ties, Inc.90 case should be considered in light of the holding in the Ralph
C. Wilson, Sr.91 case.
In Retail Properties, Inc. the transferor sold four of its five rental
properties to a wholly owned subsidiary and the other property was sold
to an outsider. These sales were made pursuant to a plan of complete
liquidation under section 337 and therefore no gain or loss was reported
by the transferor and the shareholders reported either a capital gain
or loss under 331 upon distribution of the assets. The Tax Court, how-
ever, found that "the assets transferred were ample to accomplish the
continuance of the rental business petitioner had carried on before the
transferor." 92 Therefore, the transaction was held to fall within section
354(b) (1) (A), notwithstanding the fact that shares of stock of the
transferee-subsidiary (having a value in excess of the transferred prop-
erties held by the transferor) were not included in the transfer of assets
to the subsidiary corporation. 98
In Ralph C. Wilson, Sr.94 the Tax Court, after finding that all the
assets that were necessary or appropriate to the conduct of the business
of Associates (the liquidating corporation) were transferred to Agency
(the new corporation) held that "section 337(a), like section 331, is inap-
89. The question of excluding and including various steps in a series of trans-
actions permeates this entire area of taxation. See pp. 443-46 infra.
90. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1463 (1964).
91. 46 T.C. 334 (1966).
92. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1463, 1472 (1964).
93. Id.
94. 46 T.C. 334, 345 (1966).
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plicable, since there was no 'complete liquidation' of Associates."9 5 There-
fore, where some assets are sold to outsiders, as occurred in Retail Prop-
erties, Inc., the gain on such a sale will not receive the non-recognition
benefits of section 337(a) but will be subject to the provisions covering
the sale of these particular type of assets.96 Additionally, this amount
will necessarily increase the earnings and profits account of the liquidat-
ing corporation thereby expanding the possible effect of section 356(b)
treatment of "boot." It would therefore appear to be appropriate when
a liquidation-reincorporation is contemplated that assets, which will not
be either transferred to or placed at the disposal of the new corporation,
be distributed in kind and sold by the shareholders, thereby avoiding to
some extent the composite effect of losing section 337 treatment. More-
over, when planning a liquidation-reincorporation transaction the planner
should seriously consider distributing in kind not only the liquid assets
of the business but also all operating assets which may not be necessary
to the continuing conduct of the trade or business as well as those assets
which may be obsolete and need to be replaced. By doing so, one may
be placed in a better position to argue that "substantially all" the operat-
ing assets were not transferred or placed at the disposal of the successor
corporation. However, if one is faced with the situation where some
assets are sold to outsiders by the corporation then he might argue that,
unless a section 337 liquidation was contemplated by the parties, no one
would risk running afoul of the effect of the non-recognition provisions
when he could just as easily distribute the assets and then sell them.97
However, this would be a boot strap argument at best and should not
be relied on except under extremely difficult circumstances.
2. Transfer of Securities Pursuant To a Plan of Reorganization
Under the provisions of section 354(a) (1) no gain or loss shall
result from a transaction where "stock or securities in a corporation a
party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization,
exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation or in an-
other corporation a party to the reorganization."98 From this language
it would appear that unless securities or stock are transferred pursuant
to a plan of reorganization the transaction would fail to fall within its
provisions thereby removing the transaction from the operation of section
95. Id. at 352.
96. The amount of gain or loss and its characterization will depend on whether
it is a capital or non-capital asset (see INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1231) and if it is
the former then a question arises as to the applicability of the "recapture provisions."
INT. Rzv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1245, 1250.
97. But see Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). For a full discussion of the
problems that arise in this type of transaction, see B. BITTKPR & J. EuSTicx, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OP CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 5.21, at 181-82 & n.76
(2d ed. 1966).
98. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 354(a) (1).
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368(a) (1) (D). On several occasions the Tax Court was called upon to
determine whether this result would be forthcoming in a reincorporation
transaction where stock or securities were not transferred.
In James Armour, Inc.99 the court was faced with a situation where
the liquidating and successor corporations were, immediately before the
series of transactions, in a brother-sister relationship. Therefore, there
was no need for the successor corporation to transfer any of its securities
or stock either to the liquidating corporation or directly to its share-
holders in order to maintain continuity of ownership. The court answered
the argument that the provisions of section 354(a) (1) were not met by
stating: "The issuance of further stock would have been a meaningless
gesture, and we cannot conclude that the statute requires such a vain
act."'100 The court has persisted in this position 101 and there would ap-
pear to be little value in structuring a transaction in such a way as to
hopefully avoid reorganization treatment by excluding as part of the
transaction the exchange or transfer of stock or securities.
A somewhat related problem was posed by the Reef Corp.02 case
where the shareholders conveyed all their stock in the liquidating cor-
poration to a "strawman" for cash and personal notes. By doing this
the shareholders were attempting to structure their transaction so that
the stock or securities which they held in the successor corporation could
not be used to determine whether they, as shareholdrs in the liquidating
corporation, had control of the successor corporation immediately after
the transfer as required by section 368(a) (1) (D).10 3 That is to say, for
purposes of section 368(a) (1) (D) they were not shareholders in the
liquidating corporation immediately preceding the transfer of the assets
by the liquidating corporation and therefore their stockholdings in the
successor corporation could not be used to determine control. The Tax
Court ignored the sale to the strawman and found that in fact the trans-
ferees maintained ownership of the stock.
When the position of the Tax Court is analyzed as to each attempt
to frustrate the imposition of reorganization treatment, it is clear that
it will proceed beyond the mere superficial structure of any transaction
and draw upon only those facts which form the substance of the trans-
action. Thus, it would seem to be a fruitless use of legal gymnastics to
structure any liquidation-reincorporation in a way such as was done above
99. 43 T.C. 295 (1965). See also Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d
Cir. 1961), rev'g 33 T.C. 30 (1959), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1961).
100. 43 T.C. at 307.
101. E.g., South Texas Rice Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. 540, 568-69 (1965), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. J.E. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966)
Ralph C. Wilson, Sr., 46 T.C. 334, 344 (1966).
102. 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379 (1965), aff'd, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1966). For further discussion of this case, see p. 450 infra.
103. 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 393.
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so as to avoid the technical requirements of sections 354(a) (1) or
368(a) (1) (D), ' 4 but to comply with the theory and purpose of the
reorganization provisions. 10 5
3. Control Requirement and Gallagher - Separating the Transaction
Section 368(a) (1) (D) provides that in order to have a reorganiza-
tion "immediately after the transfer the transferor or one or more of its
shareholders . . .or any combination thereof, is in control of the corpora-
tion to which the assets are transferred .... "10 Whether a shareholder
or a combination of shareholders are in control of a corporation will,
in turn, depend upon a finding that either as individuals or in combina-
tion they own "stock possessing at least 80 per centum of the total com-
bined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least
80 per centum of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock
of the [surviving] corporation."'10 7
In Joseph C. Gallagher'08 the Tax Court was faced with the ques-
tion whether a failure to meet this requirement would prevent the im-
position of reorganization treatment in a liquidation-reincorporation set-
ting. The Commissioner did not argue that a "D" type reorganization
had occurred. However, the Tax Court noted that his failure to press
this argument was probably "because only 72% percent of California's
stock [the new corporation] was owned by former shareholders of Dela-
ware [the disappearing corporation] .-'0
If there was any question as to the Tax Court's opinion on this
issue, it was clearly removed in the Hyman H. Berghash"0 case. In
Berghash, the one shareholder "who owned 198 out of the 200 outstand-
ing shares of the old corporation (the remaining 2 shares being held by
his wife), acquired only 50 percent of the outstanding common stock
of Dorn's Drugs, Inc. [the new corporation] . . . ."I" The Tax Court
stated that: "In the situation here presented it is impossible to view the
result as a (D) reorganization because of the conspicuous failure of the
transaction to qualify under the 'control requirements' of subparagraph
(D) and section 368(c). '1 2
An interesting sidelight of the Berghash case was the fact that the
sole shareholder in the old corporation held an option to purchase the
104. From this it could be said that the reorganization sections are not really
elective but that the transaction will fall within them if it falls within their intended
purpose. Cf. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
105. But see pp. 446-52 infra.
106. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (D).
107. INT. Ri V. CODE of 1954, § 368(c).
108. 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acquiesced in result only, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 5.
109. Id. at 161. Contrast this strict interpretation of "control" as one of the
technical requirements of finding a reorganization with the Tax Court's liberal
interpretive approach to other technical requirements. See pp. 436-42 supra.
110. 43 T.C. 743 (1965), aft'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966).
111. Id. at 755-56.
112. Id. at 755 (emphasis added).
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other 50 percent stock interest in the new corporation held by the new
shareholder. As to the possibility that the old shareholder might, in the
future, acquire total ownership of the new corporation, the Tax Court
noted that the attribution rules of section 318 were not incorporated
into section 368(c)1 3 and that "[t]he existence of an unexercised option
has been held to be of no consequence in determining control for cor-
porate reorganization purposes."' 14 The obvious question arising from
this language, and as yet unanswered, is whether an option which is ex-
ercised a short time following the reorganization would meet the "im-
mediately after the transfer" language of section 368(a) (1) (D).115
4. Step Transaction Doctrine
The rationale implicit in the Tax Court's holdings in the "D" re-
organization cases is that once various steps in a transaction are viewed
as a whole in order to determine whether a plan of reorganization exists,
one cannot segregate out certain parts of the total transaction for the
purposes of analyzing specific issues. This position, quite clearly, is con-
trary to that taken by the Service in Rev. Rul. 61-156111 and Treas.
Regs. §§ 1.301-1 and 1.331-1 (c). The resolution of this conflict neces-
sarily depends on the view taken of the operation of the "step trans-
action" doctrine and its application to a liquidation-reincorporation trans-
action. Generally, there are two ways in which the step transaction doc-
trine has been stated by the courts. First, the doctrine is referred to in
terms of "the intended end result." This test requires one to "examine
the situation as it existed at the beginning and end of a series of steps
and the object sought to be accomplished .... ,,17 The doctrine has
also been couched in terms of a "mutually interdependent steps" theory.
This test requires one to take a series of transactions and determine which
steps "are so interdependent that the legal relations created by them would
have been fruitless without a completion of the series."" 8 The effect of
using the step transaction doctrine is to apply the Code on the basis of
the cumulative effect of all the individual steps ignoring the independent
significance of each step.
The Service, in its revenue ruling," 9 attempts to split off those
transactions which are not necessary to the finding of a reorganization
113. Id. at 757.
114. Id. at 758 (emphasis added).
115. If such a situation arises, the court will probably ignore the existence of the
option in the same manner as it ignored the transfer of all the shares to a "strawman"
in Reef Corp., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379 (1964). See p. 441 supra. Therefore,
control within the meaning of section 368(c) will have been met and the transaction
would probably qualify as a "D" type reorganization.
116. 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 62.
117. Grubb, Corporate Manipulations Under Subchapter C: Reincorporation -
Liquidation, 28 U. CIN. L. Rxv. 304, 306-07 n.4 (1959). See also James Armour, Inc.,
43 T.C. 295, 305 (1964). See also Lipkind, Gallagher Revisited: The Functionally
Unrelated Corporate Reorganization, 13 VILL. L. Rev. 487, 521-23 (1968).
118. Grubb, supra note 61, at 306-07 n.4. See also Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C.
144, 156 (1962), acquiesced in result only, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 5.
119. Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 62.
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and treat those as separate and distinct for tax purposes. Thus, in a case
such as Gallagher.20 the Service would treat as separate and distinct trans-
actions the removal of the shareholders from the old corporation (re-
demption out) and the issuance of stock in the new corporation to the
new shareholders (new issuance). As a result of this, there would be
a 100 percent continuity of proprietary interest from the old to the new
corporation. Additionally, the Service, vis-A-vis the implementation of
its regulations, will take certain steps and restructure them as they might
have occurred absent the reorganization, when such steps were used
solely for "tax avoidance purposes"' 21 (i.e., devoid of a valid business
purpose). Once it is found that the balance of the transactions had no
business purpose, the Service will then proceed to apply what in effect is
a form versus substance test. By doing this, the series of transactions
would be restructured to find a dividend with respect to the stock of the
old corporation under section 301.
The inherent problem with this approach is that the distribution
flows from a corporation which is no longer in existence and would
therefore appear to be a clear section 331 liquidating distribution and
should properly be treated as such. The Service, in order to avoid sec-
tion 331 treatment, must ignore the fact that there exists two very
separate and distinct taxable entities as recognized by the Code and find,
in substance, that there is only one.1 22 The Service, however, has not
been consistent even on the point of ignoring the fact that two corpora-
tions exist as evidenced by Rev. Rul. 61-156 where, after finding a
section 301 dividend, they held that either an "E" or "F" type reorgani-
zation has occurred. The "F" type reorganization clearly requires two
separate corporations123 and thus clearly conflicts with the prior position
that there is only one corporation. There would appear to be two reasons
for this inconsistent approach. First, the Service may be unsure of its
position ignoring the existence of two corporations and thus the con-
comitant liquidation and reincorporation. Second, it may be pressing
reorganization treatment for fear that the court may be unable or un-
willing to implement the carryover of certain corporate attributes 124 to
120. Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acquiesced in result only, 1964-2
CUM. BULL. 5.
121. When Treas. Reg. §§ 1.331-1(c) and 1.301-1 are read in conjunction withRev. Rul. 61-156 it appears that the Service will attempt to impose complete dividend
treatment under the regulation on any distributions flowing from a liquidation-rein-
corporation where tax avoidance was a principal motivating factor for structuring
the transaction in this form.
122. For a discussion of ignoring the liquidation as a possible solution to the rein-
corporation problem, see pp. 458-61 infra.
123. The traditionally "F" type reorganization will involve an active business
which is merging into a newly established corporate shell. Therefore, there necessarily
will be two corporations involved in any "F" type reorganizaiton. Additionally, inJames Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295, 305 (1964), the court stated: "It is well settled
that the liquidation of a corporation may be merely a step in a reorganization." See
also Hyman A. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743, 755 (1965), aff'd 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966).
124. Section 381 provides for the carryover of corporate attributes between parties
to a reorganization. This section has only been applied when a reorganization has
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the successor corporation absent a reorganization. However, if the court
were willing to ignore the existence of the two corporations for the
purposes of section 301, there would appear to be no reason not to con-
tinue this approach when faced with the issue of carryover of corporate
attributes. 25 That is to say, if there is, in substance, only one corpora-
tion then how could there be any question of carryover. It would ap-
pear that the uncertainty of the Service's position was probably the
motivating factor behind the ruling that either an "E" or "F" reorgani-
zation had occurred on the basis of the facts submitted for the ruling.
A very plausible argument could be made in support of the Service's
position with respect to treating the transactions as if only one corpora-
tion exists. The Service may point to the fact that the liquidation-
reincorporation, when viewed as a whole, is a device for bailing-out earn-
ings unsupported by a valid business purpose within the framework of
Gregory v. Helvering.126 Once this is accepted then the Commissioner
may restructure the transaction to properly reflect what has occurred
for the purposes of taxing the transaction.
The Tax Court has not been willing to accept this argument. In-
stead, they persist in trying to plug the liquidation-reincorporation loop-
hole with the reorganization provisions of the Code. Once this position
is taken by the court, it will then proceed to group the series of trans-
actions into one refusing to segregate any steps of the series which they
feel is a part of the plan of reorganization. If the composite effect of
the series of events is not a reorganization then they will treat the
transaction as a valid liquidation under section 331 and reincorporation
under section 351. However, beyond the Tax Court, the Service has
met with some success. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, in a series of
recent cases,'12 has been willing to fragment a series of transactions in
line with the approach of Rev. Rul. 61-156 and thereby find that an
"F" type reorganization has taken place where there was a change in
proprietary interest and where two going corporations merged. The
use of the "F" type reorganization by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits neces-
sarily will require some discussion as to how they apply its provisions and
been found to exist. Therefore, absent any statutory authority for the forced carryover
of corporate attributes, a court may be reluctant to impose such treatment. In Joseph
C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acquiesced in result only, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 5,
the Tax Court expressed this feeling when it said:
The basic approach of the complicated series of enactments incorporated in
the 1954 Code appears to be that all such situations are to be tested by the
"reorganization" portion of the statute, and that . . . if a transaction of a similar
kind does not fall within them . . . it shall be treated as a transaction giving
rise to gain or loss and not as a distribution.
Id. at 157-58.
125. See pp. 446-49 infra where the Fifth Circuit in Davant v. Commissioner,
366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'g in part and rev'g in part South Texas Rice Ware-house Co., 43 T.C. 540 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1966) did, in effect,
ignore the existence of the two corporations to find a dividend to the extent of the
earnings and profits of both parties to the reorganization.
126. 293 U.S. 465 (1934).
127. See pp. 446-52 infra for a complete discussion of these cases.
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why they disagree with the Tax Court on this point and the ramifica-
tions of the use of the "F" reorganization as to other aspects of the
reorganization transaction.
C. "F" Type Reorganization
Section 368(a) (1) (F) defines as a reorganization a transaction where
a "mere change in identity, form, or place of organization of a corpora-
tion however effected"' 28 has been carried out by the taxpayer. Until
recently, this type of reorganization was little used and was generally
felt to cover relatively few corporate rearrangements.' 29  The first ap-
plication of subsection (F) to a liquidation-reincorporation occurred in
the Pridemark, Inc. 3 0 case. In Pridemark the Tax Court held that an
"F" reorganization had taken place where brother-sister corporations were
liquidated and, after the lapse of a period of time, the major assets were
reincorporated into one corporation. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit re-
versed the Tax Court' 3 ' on this issue stating that "[T]he facts of this
case do not bring it within the 'reincorporation' area because the trans-
actions were not motivated by a desire to avoid the payment of taxes."'132
The court then held that "[s]ince there is a complete liquidation . . .
within the meaning of sections 331 and 337, the distributions to the
shareholders are entitled to be treated as a redemption of stock and
taxed as a capital gain.' 33 In subsequent cases the Tax Court refused
to follow its decision in Pridemark and found that an "F" reorganiza-
tion could not occur where two or more businesses are liquidated and
reincorporated into one corporate form since "substantial changes [i.e.,
not a "mere change"] did occur when the separate businesses . ..were
united in a new corporation.' 34
Decisions rendered by the Fifth Circuit, on appeals from the Tax
Court, applied the holding of Pridemark and, as of now, have not reversed
their position. The case of J. E. Davant v. Commissioner13 5 was the
first of these cases where the Fifth Circuit found that either a "D" or
"F" reorganization 38 had occurred where there was a liquidation of a
"going concern" and a later reincorporation of its assets into another
"going concern" which was wholly owned by the same shareholders. The
128. INT. Rv. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (F).
129. See, e.g., Lipkind, Gallagher Revisited: The Functionally Unrelated Cor-
porate Reorganization, 13 VILL. L. Rv. 487, 500-04 (1968).
130. 42 T.C. 510 (1964).
131. Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965).
132. Id. at 41 (emphasis added). One consideration for this finding might have
been that "there was no testimony that the stockholders were under any legal or moral
compulsion to reconvey their assets . . . ." Id. at 38. See pp. 428-31 supra for a
discussion of decisions rendered against the finding of a reorganization under the
1939 Code.
133. Id. at 42.
134. Estate of Bernard H. Stauffer, 48 T.C. 277, 300 (1967), rev'd, 403 F.2d 611
(9th Cir. 1968).
135. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'g in part and rev'g in part South Texas
Rice Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. 540 (1965).
136. Id. at 887.
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court then went on to hold that the distribution of the liquid assets was
"functionally unrelated" to the reorganization and that they were to be
treated as a dividend under section 301.137 The extent of the dividend
treatment was the combined earnings and profits of both parties to the
reorganization. 38 By reaching this result, the court was apparently adopt-
ing the approach of Rev. Rul. 61-156 and Treas. Regs. §§ 1.301-1 and
1.331-1(c). Contrary to the position of the Tax Court, the Fifth Circuit
took the approach that not all steps from the beginning to the end of
a series of transactions need fall within the plan of reorganization as
a result of using the step transaction doctrine. Rather, the court looked
at the series of transactions to determine which were "functionally re-
lated" and grouped those separately from those not found to be "mutually
interdependent.I13 9 Therefore, it was found that the distribution of the
liquid assets did not depend on the use of a reorganization and, con-
versely, that the reorganization of the two corporations did not necessitate
the distribution of liquid assets. However, the court went beyond segregat-
ing the distribution of the liquid assets from the reorganization and found
that the extent of the dividend was to be determined by the earnings and
profits of both corporations who were parties to the reorganization. 40
In effect, the court probably felt that the reorganization was no more
than a vehicle for disguising a dividend from the successor corporation
to the shareholders who owned both parties to the reorganization.1
41
Therefore, it would appear that the Fifth Circuit will run into the same
problems as the Service with its Revenue Ruling in that in order to
reach its result it must find that throughout the series of transactions in
issue only one corporation existed for tax purposes. 42
This appears to be the position taken by the Fifth Circuit in Davant
as evidenced by the following: "Water [the successor corporation] and
Warehouse [the liquidating corporation] were but different pockets in
137. Id. at 888. The court held that the $700,000 petitioners received from Water
and the $200,000 petitioners received from Warehouse were dividends under section 301
declared incident to a reorganization.
138. Id. at 889. The court stated: "Where there is complete identity of stock-
holders the use of the earnings and profits of both corporations is the only logical way
to test which distributions have the effect of a dividend."
139. Functionally unrelated and mutually interdependent would appear to be two
sides of the same step transaction coin. However, the Tax Court and Fifth Circuit
disagree as to whether certain transactions which occur simultaneously with other
steps, which taken alone may constitute a reorganization, may be grouped separately.
See pp. 443-44 supra as to the Tax Court's approach.
140. The Fifth Circuit answered the question of the applicability of the language
"the corporation" in section 356 to the transaction in the following manner in Davant
v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874, 889 (5th Cir. 1966):
It would be illogical to say that $700,000 would be used to measure how much
of the $900,000 distribution had the effect of a dividend if Water were merged
into Warehouse and only $200,000 should be used to measure how much of the
$900,000 distribution had the effect of a dividend just because Warehouse was
merged into Water.
141. Id. at 889. The court said that "Warehouse was a conduit for Water's
distributions of $700,000 .... " Id.
142. See p. 444 supra.
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the same pair of trousers worn by petitioners.' u4 3 Therefore, where a re-
organization occurs between brother-sister corporations any distributions
as a result of the reorganization will be treated as if a dividend was
paid by the undivided whole ignoring each legal piece of the corporate
group.14 4 That is, in substance, the dividend came from the commonly
controlled group although on a pure formalistic approach no dividend
could have flowed from the successor corporation's earnings and profits
as a result of the reorganization.
Although Rev. Rul. 61-156 appears to take the same avenue to find
that a section 301 dividend has occurred, the Davant case went further
to find that there was a dividend to the extent of the earnings and profits
of two going corporations. The revenue ruling was concerned with a
situation where there was only one "going concern" and only one earn-
ings and profits account and whether the Service would carry its position
to the extreme of Davant is not entirely clear.1 45
Once the analysis of the court is accepted as to the finding ofi a
section 301 dividend to the extent of the combined earnings and profits,
further questions arise as to why it is necessary to find a reorganization 146
and why the court adopted both the "D" and "F" type reorganizations.
The first question seems to be answered by the court's reluctance to break
new ground by treating what was previously treated as two separate and
distinct taxable entities as one during these series of transactions without
finding a reorganization of some type. That is, no court has gone so
far as to say that when there are two "going concerns" under common
control that in form there may be two corporations, but in substance
there is only one.' 47 In the cases presented, the problem is not one com-
bining two going corporations which have not "in form" been combined.
Rather, the problem is that the form of the series of transactions is such
as to create one corporation which prior to these transactions were "in
substance" one corporation and that any distributions during this period
were to be considered as coming from both corporations. Therefore, it
would be unnecessary to find that a reorganization has occurred but for
the formalistic necessity of such a finding under the Code.
The Code has continually recognized the existence of corporations
as separate taxable entities and has not conditioned the finding of what
143. 366 F.2d 874, 889 (5th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added).
144. Casco Prods. Co., 49 T.C. 32 (1967).
145. From the recent cases of Estate of Bernard H. Stauffer, 48 T.C. 277 (1967),
rev'd, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968) and Associated Machine, 48 T.C. 318 (1967),
rev'd, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968), it appears that the Service will not press the
Davant holding that an "F" reorganization can take place between two viable
corporations.
146. The court ignored the two corporate forms for the purpose of finding a
section 301 dividend and there would appear to be no reason why the same approach
could not be taken as to the balance of the transactions and find that, in substance,
these were a series of transactions involving but one taxable entity.
147. See Estate of Bernard H. Stauffer, 48 T.C. 277 298 (1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968), where the Tax dourt rejected this contention
when made by the petitioner.
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is a corporation on any "in substance" requirement. 148 Therefore, more
for the purposes of form than substance, it becomes necessary to find
a reorganization under the provisions of the Code. Otherwise, in form,
a sale and liquidation has occurred which necessarily would conflict with
any theory that these two corporations were, in fact, one. That is, the
court will require both "in form" and "in substance" one corporation
before it could possibly find a dividend to the extent of the earnings and
profits of both corporations as they existed prior to the series of trans-
actions in question. If this were not the case, then by applying a form
versus substance test to any dividend of commonly controlled companies
it would appear that a dividend would be determined to the extent of
the earnings and profits of both corporations. Therefore, the "in sub-
stance" section 301 dividend to the extent of the earnings and profits of
both corporations can only occur when there is "in form" a series of
transactions amounting to a reorganization.
After it is found that a reorganization is required in order to combine
earnings and profits to determine the extent of the dividend, the obvious
question is what type of reorganization must be found or is it relevant at
all which type is found. The court in Davant felt that whether the re-
organization was a "D" or "F" type was inconsequential. 49 It is sub-
mitted that, if the rationale of the Davant opinion is accepted, whether
a "D" or an "F" type reorganization is found to have occurred should be
immaterial. However, the rationale of the court's opinion would more
easily fit within the theory of an "F" reorganization than a "D". The
court's opinion could be considered as expanding the concept of "same-
ness"'8 0 in the "F" situation to cover reorganizations within a commonly
controlled group of corporations.
In Davant, the fact considered to be critical by the court was the
"in substance" uniformity of the corporations before and after the series
of transactions amounting to a reorganization. However, the court's find-
ing of an "F" reorganization where two going corporations are the par-
ties to the reorganization goes beyond what is normally felt to be an
"F" type reorganization. In fact, the Service in Rev. Rul. 61-156 has
not gone this far in that it found an "F" reorganization where there was
a transfer of assets from a going concern to a new corporate shell.
148. That is to say, that where there are two viable corporations in distinct
businesses which are under common control have not been treated as one taxable
entity. See Associated Mach., 48 T.C. 318, 327 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 403
F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968).
149. In that the dividend was separate from the reorganization its character and
extent would not be controlled by the type of reorganization involved. That is,
whether a "D" or "F" type reorganization was found would not affect that decision
under the court's rationale.
150. See Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743, 752 (1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d
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In the subsequent case of Reef Corp. v. Commissioner 5' the same
court found that an "F" reorganization had occurred where there was
a 48 percent change in shareholder ownership. In Reef the court was
faced with the transfer of assets by a going concern to an inactive cor-
porate shell. 15 2 However, as a result of the series of transactions 48
percent of the shareholders in the liquidating corporation disappeared
while the remaining 52 percent had acquired 100 percent ownership of
the new corporation. 15 3 The court viewed the change in ownership as
a "functionally unrelated" redemption of stock wholly separate from
the reorganization. 5 4 Once this aspect of the transaction was removed
the court had little trouble in finding 100 percent continuity of owner-
ship and business operations with the resulting consequence of finding
an "F" reorganization.
When Reef and Davant are considered together, it becomes clear
that the Fifth Circuit has adopted the position of the Service in Rev.
Rul. 61-156 as to the treatment of "boot" received as a 301 dividend
and the siphoning off of any change in ownership from the plan of re-
organization. 15 5 It is also clear from Davant that they have even gone
further than the revenue ruling by finding an "F" reorganization where
two going concerns are the parties to the reorganization and by combin-
ing the earnings and profits of both corporations to determine the extent
of the 301 dividend. In effect, the Fifth Circuit has prevented any de-
gree of earnings bail-out through the use of the liquidation-reincorporation
transaction.'5 6
In cases arising in the Tax Court subsequent to Davant and Reef
it is clear that the Fifth Circuit by extending the effect of the revenue
ruling to the combination of two going concerns has created significant
problems in the application of section 381(b) .1 7 Section 381 (b) pro-
vides for the carryback of a net operating loss to pre-reorganization
earnings if that reorganization was of the "F" variety. In Estate of
Bernard H. Stauffer's the Tax Court was confronted with a situation
where three commonly controlled companies were reorganized into one
corporation. In the year subsequent to the reorganization the successor
corporation sustained a net operating loss which it wished to carryback
to pre-reorganization earnings. Petitioner based his argument for allow-
151. 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1966), rev'g 24 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 379 (1965).
152. Thus, there was no question, as in Davant, as to what would be the extent
of the dividend.
153. But see Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1941).
154. 368 F.2d at 134.
155. See pp. 443-44 supra.
156. See note 140 supra where the Davant court indicated the potential earningsbail-out possibilities by the mere choice of which going concern should be merged
into the other.
157. INT. Rev. COD9 of 1954, § 381(b).
158. 48 T.C. 277 (1967), rev'd, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968). For a discussion of
Davant and Reef and their effect on these cases, see Grossberg, Type F Reorganiza-
tion in the Fifth Circuit: The Mouse That Roared, 5 HouSTON L. REv. 926 (1968).
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ance of the carryback on the theory that either one or three separate "F"
type reorganizations had occurred thus bringing into operation sectioi
381 (b). The Tax Court refused to allow the carryback and held that
a "D" rather than one or three "F" reorganization had taken place.
The basis of the Tax Court's decision was that the merger of three going
concerns into one inactive shell could not be considered a "mere change
in form." The Tax Court viewed the consolidation as a change in the
substance of the business on the theory that the character of any of the
several businesses could not exist in the same manner after the consoli-
dation as before it. That is, there is a complete change in capital struc-
ture along with an increase in the assets to which a creditor might look
to satisfy his claims.15 9 Additionally, there were significant changes in
accounting and the complete disappearance of any inter-company sales
and purchases. The Tax Court followed their position in Stauffer and
refused to find an "F" reorganization in the subsequent Associated
Mach.160 case where one going corporation was merged into another
active commonly controlled company. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit,
both cases were reversed' 61 and the court found that an "F" reorganiza-
tion had occurred using the reasoning of Davant162 As a result of the
court's holding, the net operating loss sustained by the surviving corpo-
ration in the years subsequent to the merger were allowed to be carried
back pursuant to section 381(b). However, in Stauffer, the court spe-
cifically pointed out that the post-merger loss of the transferee company
must be specifically apportionable to the present operations of the pre-
merger identities in order to permit an apportioned amount of the trans-
ferees loss to be carried back to the profitable operations of the pre-
merger identities. 163 With this narrow holding the court must have found
that three "F" reorganizations occurred and not one, for if in fact one
had taken place it would not be necessary for the court to establish such
stringent standards for the apportionment of the loss carryback. That
is, if one "F" reorganization was found the loss of the transferee subse-
quent to the merger could be carried back with ease to the combined
operations of the three pre-merger entities. It should be noted, there-
fore, that the court's analysis results in an anomaly in that to find that
an "F" reorganization has occurred it viewed the total enterprise -
identity of ownership and of business operations - while to apportion
the loss carryback, it viewed components of the reorganization separately.
Though analytically difficult to justify, the Ninth Circuit has achieved
an equitable result by relying on the reasoning of Davant. Although more
159. Id. at 300-01.
160. 48 T.C. 318 (1967), rev'd, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968).
161. Estate of Bernard H. Stauffer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968),
rev'g 48 T.C. 277 (1967) ; Associated Mach. v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir.
1968), rev'g 48 T.C. 318 (1967).
162. Estate of Bernard H. Stauffer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 611, 618-21 (9th
Cir. 1968); Associated Mach. v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 622, 624 (9th Cir. 1968).
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than one going concern was involved in this "F" reorganization it is not
illogical to say that a loss carryback should be permitted on this factual
posture and, in fact, the Tax Court has recognized a similar result in
Casco Prods. Co.'6 4 There, the court skirted the question of whether an
"F" reorganization occurred when there was a nine percent change in
shareholder interest, and held that a loss carryback was permissible since
the essence of the corporations involved was the same before and after
the restructuring.' 65
In comparing these cases with Davant, it is clear that the Ninth
Circuit at least partially concurs with the Fifth Circuit's view of an "F"
reorganization. Although the Ninth Circuit recognizes that the merger
of more than two going concerns can constitute an "F" reorganization,
it is not clear from these opinions whether the Ninth Circuit will fall in
line with the Fifth Circuit's "functionally unrelated" analysis as applied
to the reincorporation area.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE REINCOPORATION PROBLEM
The previous discussion clearly demonstrates the inadequacy of fight-
ing "reincorporations" with weapons that were not designed to thwart
tax avoidance schemes. The consequences of a "D" reorganization can
easily be avoided if the taxpayer fails to meet the 80 percent control
requirement of section 36 8(c). Since the "F" reorganization in the great
majority of circuits requires a 100 percent continuity of shareholder in-
terest, 160 it can be by-passed with even greater ease. Furthermore, the
Commissioner has only caused confusion as to what constitutes a "D"
or an "F" type reorganization by attempting to bring reincorporations
within their purview.167 It is suggested, therefore, that this method of
achieving an earnings bail-out should be controlled either through a specific
statutory amendment or by cutting through the form of these transactions
to their substance. Although the scope of this Comment does not permit
a comprehensive statutory proposal, a format for the solution of this
problem will be set forth after a discussion of other suggestions designed
to correct this deficiency in the Code.
A. 1954 House Proposal
As noted above, the House version of the 1954 Code included a
section designed to eliminate the reincorporation problem. Although it
was never enacted, an analysis of its provisions reveals certain positive
and negative aspects of this version of the statute which must be kept
in mind in proposing any solution to this problem.
164. 49 T.C. 32 (1967).
165. Id. at 36-37.
166. E.g., Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States, 233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957) ; Cushman Motor Works v. Commissioner, 130
F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 756 (1943). See also p. 446 supra.
167. See pp. 446-52 supra.
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Section 357168 generally provided that when shareholders in control
of a corporation receive assets on complete or partial liquidation and
within 5 years thereof transfer at least 50 percent of the assets, exclusive
of money and other securities, to another corporation pursuant to section
351, the fair market value of the assets not so transferred shall be treated
as a dividend to the extent of the earnings and profits of the original
corporation. 169 In addition, the basis of the assets in the hands of the
liquidated corporation would carryover to the second corporation. 170 How-
ever, these results would not occur unless a principal motive for effectuat-
ing such a transaction was to avoid assessing distributions of the liqui-
dated corporation at ordinary income rates.' 7 '
The most glaring defect of this proposal was its inapplicability to
the other methods available in the reincorporation context to achieve an
earnings bail-out.17 2 The statute only covered that fact situation where
the old corporation liquidated its assets in kind and the shareholders
thereof retransferred them to a second corporation. As noted earlier,
the sale of assets-liquidation and the pre-incorporation-liquidation devices
would bring about substantially the same result, but the statute was
obviously not intended to cover these devices. The question may well
be asked why these schemes were eliminated from the scope of the stat-
ute. Although no answer is found in the legislative history, it is probably
168. H.R. REF. No. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1954). The section provided:
Sec. 357. LIQUIDATION FOLLOWED BY REINCORPORATION.
(a) General Rule. - In any case in which one or more individuals receive
assets in a complete or partial liquidation as defined in section 336 from a corpora-
tion controlled by such individual or individuals and within 5 years from the date
of the final distribution in such liquidation transfer more than 50 percent of such
(assets other than money and stock or securities (other than stock or securities
representing an interest in the distributing corporation)) to one or more cor-
porations controlled by one or more of such individuals in a transaction to which
section 351 is applicable-
(1) the corporation to which any of such assets have been transferred shall
be deemed to have received such assets from the liquidating corporation pur-
suant to a corporate acquisition of property within the meaning of section
359(c) ; and
(2) an amount equal to the fair market value of the assets received in
liquidation not so transferred shall be deemed to have been received by the
individuals in control of such other corporation or corporations as a distribu-
tion under section 352 pursuant to such corporate acquisition of property and
such distribution shall be deemed to have occurred on the date the assets were
transferred to such other corporation or corporations. For the purpose of
this subsection one or more individuals shall be considered to be in control
of a corporation if such individuals own directly or indirectly stock which
represents at least 50 percent of the total combined voting power of the out-
standing stock of such corporation of the total value of shares of all classes
of stock of such corporation.
(b) Transfer Not In Avoidance Of Tax. - Subsection (a) shall not be
applicable in any case in which it is established by the taxpayer that such trans-
actions did not have as one of their principal purposes the avoidance of tax on
corporate distributions of property under section 301.
(c) Attributtion Of Ownership. - For the purpose of this section in determin-
ing the ownership of stock and the receipt of assets, section 311 shall be applicable.
169. Subsection (a).
170. Subsection (a) (1).
171. Subsection (b).
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justifiable to state that the drafters of the statute were satisfied that the
other methods employed to reincorporate would be effectively controlled
by the definition of a "D" reorganization under the 1954 Revenue Act,
as they had been under the 1939 Act.1 73
The statute, however, had redeeming features. First, it was drafted
so that only those shareholders of the liquidated corporation who trans-
ferred the operating assets they received on liquidation to a second cor-
poration would be denied capital gains treatment.17 4  Those who did
not participate in the reincorporation were still entitled to capital gains
treatment on the liquidation pursuant to section 331. This obviously was
more equitable than present treatment afforded shareholders when the
courts find that a reincorporation constitutes a reorganization. In such
a case, the distribution to all the transferor's shareholders, even those
who did not retransfer their assets, would be taxed pursuant to section
356(a) (1) and (2) 175 which provides that "boot" distributions received
in a reorganization shall be treated as a dividend the extent of the liqui-
dated corporations earnings and profits, if a gain is realized on the ex-
change. Therefore, those shareholders who arguably received a valid
liquidating distribution because they intended to terminate their invest-
ment in the corporation'1 " would be taxed at ordinary income rates.
The inequities of taxing every shareholder in the same manner are ob-
vious. 1
77
A second noteworthy aspect of this statute is that provision which
calls for the transfer to the second corporation to be made pursuant to
section 351.178 That section provides for non-recognition of gain or loss
when taxpayers transfer property to a corporation "in exchange for its
stock or securities"' 79 if, immediately after the transfer such persons
are in control of the transferee corporation. "Control" in section 351 is
defined the same as in section 368(c) - "ownership of stock possess-
ing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes
of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of
shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation." As noted before,
this definition enabled taxpayers to avoid a reorganization by inten-
tionally losing control of the transferee corporation. However, this same
definition of control when used in proposed section 357 worked for the
benefit of the Commissioner. If the taxpayer attempted to fall without
the purview of proposed section 357 by losing control of the transferee
corporation, the transfer to the second corporation will not fall within
173. For an analysis of the reincorporation problem under the pre-1954 Code, see
pp. 426-31 supra.
174. Subsection (a)(2).
175. INT. Riv. CODE of 1954, § 356(a)(1)(2). See p. 458 infra for a discussion
of this section.
176. For a discussion of what constitutes a complete liquidation pursuant to section
331 of the 1954 Code, see p. 460 infra.
177. See p. 458 infra for an in-depth discussion of the inequities of section 356.
178. INT. Rtv. CODE of 1954, § 351.
179. Id., § 357(a).
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the non-recognition provisions of section 351. The transfer to the cor-
poration then will be subject to ordinary income treatment. The tax
burden on transferring assets without section 351 will be significantly
greater than if the distribution or liquidation of the transferor which is
not retransferred to the second corporation is taxed as a dividend pur-
suant to proposed section 357.180 Attempting avoidance of this section,
therefore, by giving up control of the transferee could only work to the
detriment of the taxpayer.
A third aspect of proposed section 357 which merits discussion is
subsection (b). It provided that the operative language of subsection
(a) shall not apply if the taxpayer can prove that the transaction did
not have as one of its "principal purposes" the avoidance of tax on a
distribution pursuant to section 301.181 This provision created a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the Service that the transaction was entered
into for the purpose of tax avoidance. On this point one might have
argued that requiring tax avoidance to be a principal purpose was a mis-
judgment or oversight on the part of the drafters. Practically, however,
since these transactions are so complex, it may safely be said that they
would not be carried out unless tax avoidance was the principal purpose.
Illustrative of this point is Joseph C. Gallagher.182  In Gallagher the
taxpayers claimed the following valid business reasons for entering into
a liquidation-reincorporation: (1) to eliminate certain stockholders who
no longer had an active part in the business; (2) to permit Gallagher
to acquire sufficient stock to gain control; (3) to provide other members
of management with shareholder status in order to instill in them in-
centive.183 However, to achieve these business purposes the taxpayers
effectuated an incredibly complex transaction which had, as a by-product,
the distribution of the liquidated corporation's earnings and profits at
capital gains rates.184 These business purposes, however, could have been
achieved by alternative means. The undesirable shareholders could have
been redeemed out under section 302185 and those who were interested
in becoming shareholders of the company could have either purchased
180. For example, assume that corporation A liquidates and distributes operating
and liquid assets to a single shareholder. The basis of the operating assets in the
shareholder's hands will be their fair market value pursuant to section 334(a). If
the taxpayer retransfers these assets to corporation B, thereby intentionally coming
without section 351 by losing control of the company, he runs the risk of incurring
a significant tax liability if the operating assets appreciate in value between the liquida-
tion of A and retransfer to B. That is, the B stock which the taxpayer receives in
exchange for the operating assets will have a value in his hands equal to the fair
market of the assets at the time of the exchange. The gain, then, taxable at ordinaryincome rates, will be the difference between the value of the stock received and his
basis for those assets which he acquired upon the liquidation of A.
181. For an explanation of section 301, see note 1 supra.
182. 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acquiesced in result only, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 5.
183. Id. at 153-54.
184. Id. at 145-55.
185. INT. Rzv. CODg of 1954, § 302(a), states that if a corporation redeems its
stock within the meaning of subdivision (b), the distribution will be treated in "part
or full payment in exchange for the stock" - capital gains treatment. Subdivision (b)
then sets forth four situations when a redemption will be treated as an exchange.
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the stock or have the company issue it to them in the form of additional
compensation. Because of this fact, it is difficult to say that tax avoidance
was not a principal purpose for entering into the reincorporation trans-
action.
B. The Subchapter C Advisory Group Proposal
In 1957, the Subchapter C Advisory Group suggested amendments
to the Code which were aimed at plugging the reincorporation loophole.' 8 6
Their solution was to redefine a "D" type reorganization as follows:
[A] transfer, whether by statutory merger or consolidation or
otherwise, of all or a part of the properties of one corporation to
another corporation if-
(i) immediately after the transfer the corporation whose prop-
erties are transferred or one or more of its shareholders, or any
combination thereof, is in control of the acquiring corporation.
(ii) if the transfer is not by statutory merger or consolidation,
the corporation whose properties are transferred is completely liqui-
dated as part of the plan pursuant to which the transfer is made
(whether such complete liquidation precedes, accompanies, or fol-
lows the transfer).17
In addition, they proposed that section 356 be revised so that when
"boot" is received in a reorganization that amount which has the "effect
of a distribution of a dividend," or has the "effect of a distribution in
redemption under section 302(b)," or has the "effect of a distribution in
partial liquidation under section 346" shall be treated accordingly. l88 Also,
the provision requiring a gain to be realized before a tax will be im-
posed was deleted.'89
The Subchapter C Advisory Group's proposed definition of a "D"
type reorganization would have resolved a number of problems which
currently plague the Commissioner in his attempts to fit a reincorpora-
tion into a "D" reorganization under the present Code. The language
of the opening paragraph, when read in combination with subsection (i),
is basically the same as the 1954 Code definition' 0° except with a few
small but important differences. The requirement that the transfer of
assets be by a corporation a party to the reorganization was stricken
and there was no reference to section 354 which requires that "substan-
tially all" the assets of the transferor be exchanged for stock or securi-
ties in the transferee. A noticeable carry-over from the 1954 Code was
the language in subsection (i) referring to where control must exist
186. The discussion herein is based on that part of the proposal set forth in an
article by MacLean, Jr., Problems of Reincorporation and Related Proposals of the
Subchapter C Advisory Group, 13 TAx L. Rtv. 407 (1958).
187. Id. at 421.
188. Id. at 423.
189. Id.
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after the transfer.' 9' Also, the section 368(c) control requirement of
the 1954 Code was incorporated into the proposal.
Subsection (ii) remedied the defect of the 1954 House proposal
(section 357) by encompassing every device employed to achieve a re-
incorporation. Although its scheme would seemingly frustrate this method
of tax avoidance, a number of problems are evident. First, as with the
existing Code, a "D" reorganization could be avoided by the taxpayer
if more than 20 percent of the stock of the transferee was distributed
to outsiders. 192 As previously noted, the Tax Court considers 80 percent
control an absolute requirement to finding a "D" reorganization. 93 Sec-
ondly, the reorganization provisions as originally enacted by Congress
were not intended for this purpose and by drafting the "D" requirements
so broadly, absurd and even harsh results may follow. For example, a
taxpayer who owns 10 percent of a corporation may receive on its liqui-
dation his proportional share of operating and liquid assets. If he decides
to establish a second corporation with the operating assets he received
on liquidation he would come within the Subchapter C Advisory Group's
"D" reorganization definition since what is required is that "part" of the
assets of the liquidated corporation be transferred. Also, a shareholder
of the liquidated corporation will own 100 percent of the second corpora-
tion, thereby clearly meeting the control requirement of section 368(c).
Upon finding a "D" reorganization the distribution of the liquid assets
may be found to have the effect of a dividend if the requirements of
proposed section 356 are met.
Imposing "D" reorganization treatment in this context, however, is
difficult to reconcile with the traditional concept of a reorganization. 9 4
Congress extends tax benefits to corporations that reorganize because it
considers that what in essence existed after the reorganization transaction
was essentially the same business under the same control as before. That
is, since there is a "continuity of interest" 95 between the old and new
corporations, Congress did not feel that this event was a proper incident
upon which to impose a tax. However, when something less than 10
percent of the operating assets of a liquidated corporation are employed
in a second corporation it is difficult to say that the second corporation
is the alter ego of the first. Though the Code's present requirement of
transferring "substantially all" the assets is a difficult standard to apply,196
it at least assures a continuity between the liquidated and second corpora-
tion and justifies affording non-recognition treatment to the transaction.
The Subchapter C Advisory Group's proposal regarding section 356,
however, would have been an extremely logical approach to taxing liqui-
191. See p. 456 supra for the text of subsection (i) and compare with INT. RSV.
CODs of 1954, § 368(c).
192. MacLean, Jr., supra note 186, at 429-30.
193. See p. 442 supra.
194. See p. 430 supra.
195. See pp. 442-43 supra.
196. See pp. 436-40 supra.
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dating distributions followed by a reincorporation. Section 356 presently
provides that when "boot" is received in a reorganization and such dis-
tribution has the effect of a dividend it shall be recognized as such to the
extent of any gain realized on the transaction. The Advisory Group's
proposal, however, would analyze each shareholder's position with respect
to the liquidated corporation in order to determine the treatment his
distribution should receive. In addition, there would be no requirement
that a gain must be realized before a recognizable event occurs. To il-
lustrate the difference in these two approaches to the taxation of "boot"
distributions, an analysis of the facts of Joseph C. Gallagher197 under both
is in order.
There were basically three types of shareholders in the Gallagher
case: first, those who had a substantial interest both in the liquidate'd
company and in the reincorporated business; second, those who had a
substantial interest in the liquidated company but whose interest in the
reincorporated business was significantly reduced; third, those who had
an interest in the liquidated company and no interest in the reincorporated
company. Under the present Code, if the Commissioner had found
that a "D" reorganization occurred the "boot" distributions of the liqui-
dated company to all three types of shareholders would receive similar
treatment under present section 356. However, under the Advisory
Group's proposal each type of shareholder would be considered separately.
The first type would receive dividend treatment since their interest in
the same business had not changed, even though the business exists in
a different corporate form whether or not they realized a gain. The second
group of shareholders, however, may be entitled to capital gains treat-
ment pursuant to section 302(b) (2) (C). If it can be established that
the liquidating distribution has the effect of a "substantially dispropor-
tionate" redemption to them, capital gains and not dividend treatment
will result. 98 The third group, since their investment in the business is
completely eliminated, should under no circumstances receive dividend
treatment. The proposal, therefore, would treat the distribution to them
as one in complete liquidation of the company pursuant to section 331
capital gains.
C. Sham Liquidation
A third method of attacking these transactions under the existing
Code, in addition to the reorganization route, is to employ the form versus
substance dichotomy. Although urged by numerous commentators' 0 and
argued by the Commissioner in cases involving liquidation-reincorpora-
tion,2 0 0 the Tax Court has literally ignored this approach.
197. 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acquiesced in result only, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 5.
198. See note 186 supra.
199. Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have The Ground Rules Really Changed,
77 HARV. L. REv. 1218. 1226 (1964) ; Rice, When is a Liquidation Not a Liquidation
For Federal Income Tax Purposes?, 8 STAN. L. Rtv. 208, 227 (1956); Schwartz,
Reincorporations Under The 1954 Code, 15 U. FLA. L. Rev. 159, 165 (1962).
200. E.g., Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35, 41 (4th Cir. 1965), rev'g
on other grounds 42 T.C. 510 (1964).
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The crux of the argument is that a liquidation, followed by a rein-
corporation, regardless of how effected, should be ignored as a sham
transaction with the distribution of the disappearing company being
treated as a dividend under section 301 rather than as a capital gain under
section 331. This argument derives its basis from Gregory v. Helvering,2 01
which held that if a transaction is entered into for no other purpose
than tax avoidance, it shall be ignored for tax purposes and the, sub-
stance of the transaction shall control the tax consequences. When cor-
poration A liquidates and shortly thereafter reappears in the form of
corporation B, the proponents of this argument urge that in fact A was
never liquidated since it still exists in another form, and the shareholders
of that corporation should not receive the benefits of a capital gain. How-
ever, it is not clear that Gregory could be pushed to the point of ignoring
the fact that one recognizable taxable entity has disappeared and that
another has arisen.20 2 This is seemingly the stumbling block which has
not, as of now, been successfully bridged by the Service. The Service
may, however, find some support for treating the transactions as involv-
ing only one corporation in the decision of the Tax Court in the Casco
Prods. Corp.20 3 case. In Casco, the majority shareholder (Standard Kolls-
man), merged Old Casco into New Casco. However, in the succeeding
year New Casco sustained a loss and the question was whether it could
be carried back to Old Casco's earnings for the purpose of securing a
tax refund. The Tax Court allowed the carryback but not on the basis
that the transaction constituted an "F" type reorganization. The Tax
Court felt that "the merger itself, although in form a reorganization, had
as its sole purpose the accomplishment of a redemption"20 4 and held
"that New Casco was simply a continuation of Old Casco and the loss
carryback should have been allowed. '20 5 The court obviously ignored
the existence of two separate and distinct taxable entities in favor of
characterizing the transaction on the basis of its substance rather than
the procedure used by the taxpayer. Although a valid business purpose
existed for the procedure used in Casco as distinguished from the liqui-
dation-reincorporation procedure,20 6 the basic thrust of the case placing
substance over form and ignoring the fact that two distinct taxable en-
tities were parties to the transaction is just as applicable to the liquidation-
201. 293 U.S. 465 (1934).
202. For a discussion of this point, see Comment, Liquidation - Reincorporation -
Commissioner Confined to Reorganization Approach in First Cases Under the 1954
Code, 32 U. CIN. L. Rev. 416, 428 (1963).
203. 49 T.C. 32 (1967). See also Rev. Rul. 66-284, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 115.
204. 49 T.C. at 36 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 37.
206. See Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 62, where tax avoidance was pointed
to as a critical factor in its ruling to segregate off and restructure certain transactions.
See pp. 443-46 supra. It does not seem that one would be stretching Casco to any
great extent by using the same form versus substance test to ignore the liquidation-
reincorporation to find that one corporation exists and that any distributions made
during the series of transactions in question amounted to a distribution with respect
to one's stock within the purview of section 301. The only distinguishing factor
between the Casco case and the situation in the revenue ruling is that in the latter
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reincorporation transaction. That is, in the liquidation-reincorporation
situation the substance of the transaction may be either a redemption,
a distribution with respect to stock, or a new issuance, or all of these
or any two of these.
The Tax Court's reluctance to use this argument as a vehicle to avoid
reincorporation is rather surprising in view of analogous cases which
have ignored the formalities of a transaction even though motivated by
a business purpose. In United States v. General Geophysical Co., 20 7
the taxpayer distributed assets with a book value of $169,290 to two
shareholders in complete redemption of their stock. A few hours after
this transaction the corporation repurchased the assets at their market
value of $764,525 from the same shareholders. The litigation arose be-
cause the corporation attempted to depreciate these assets at a basis
equal to the amount it repurchased them from the shareholders. The court
struck down the depreciation deduction, holding that there was not a
sufficient interruption in the ownership of the assets to permit the estab-
lishment of a new basis for depreciation purposes. 208 Additionally, the
court noted that each case of this type "must be decided on its own merits
by examining the form and substance of the transactions and the pur-
pose of the relevant tax provisions to determine whether recognition of
the form of the transaction would defeat the statutory purpose." 20 9
The Code itself, however, acts somewhat as a barrier to the ac-
ceptance of this argument in the reincorporation area. Section 331 (b)
states that "section 301 . . . shall not apply to any distribution of prop-
erty ... in partial or complete liquidation." If a transaction, then, comes
within the literal language of section 331(a), subsection (b) would pre-
sumably prevent the distribution from receiving dividend treatment pur-
suant to section 301. But, if it could be shown that a "complete liquida-
tion" is foreign to the concept of a reincorporation, subsection (b)
would seemingly be inapplicable and the sham liquidation argument
would have more appeal. However, the Code again is the drawback
since no where does it define the term "complete liquidation."
A concept of what a "complete liquidation" is, however, can be
gleaned from the regulations and case law. Treas. Reg. § 1.332-2(c)
states that a "status of liquidation exists when the corporation ceases to
be a going concern and its activities are merely for the purpose of winding
up its affairs, paying its debts, and distributing any remaining balance to
case the form versus substance test will increase rather than mitigate the tax burden.
See also Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743 (1965), where the court stated:[WIhere it is apparent that the corporate entity utilized by the parties to a given
transaction is a sham corporation or that the transaction in question otherwise
was without economic substance, we are not reluctant to disregard the formalities
employed and reach a result dictated by the substance thereof.
Id. at 749 (emphasis added).
207. 296 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 849 (1962).
208. Id. at 89-90.
209. Id. at 88.
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its shareholders." In the case of Kennemer v. Commissioner,210 decided
under the pre-1954 Code, the court held that the "determining element
[for deciding whether a complete liquidation occurred] was the inten-
tion to liquidate ... coupled with the actual distribution of the cash to
the stockholders." 21 ' In Pridemark, the court stated that for a complete
liquidation to occur "[t]he corporation must have ceased to be a going
corporate concern, or if the enterprise is continued in corporate form,
the shareholder must have disassociated himself from it.")212
A concept unifying these statements is that the term "complete
liquidation" in section 331 involves some sort of termination of the busi-
ness as a going concern. Though there is some authority for the proposi-
tion that the business does not have to dissolve to come within section
331,213 in that its existence can continue as a corporate shell, the active
nature of the business must cease. Comparing this view of complete
liquidation with the reasons for effectuating a reincorporation, an earn-
ings bail-out coupled with a continuation of the business in a modified
corporate form, the logical conclusion is the inapplicability of section
331 to a reincorporation. Although formally speaking corporate life was
drained from one entity, substantively the same business with the same
ownership exists in another form.
Employment of a "sham liquidation" argument would also have a
desirable side effect on the taxpayers involved in these transactions. By
not finding a reorganization, the Commissioner would not be tied to
the tax consequences of section 356 and could impose a tax on the
liquidating distribution similar to that suggested in the Subchapter C
Advisory Group's report.21 4 Also, upon finding that the liquidation was
a sham the corporate attributes of the disappearing corporation would
necessarily carry-over to the continuing business, since the foundation
of this argument is that the business never ceased but merely continued
in a different corporate form. Although, as noted, there are some prob-
lems with analyzing a reincorporation in this manner, it seemingly is a
more logical and equitable approach to this problem which does not have
the concomitant result of creating confusion.
V. PROPOSAL
Before a solution to the reincorporation problem may be posited the
end result to be achieved must first be set forth. As pointed out in part
IV of this Comment, the primary advantage of the prior proposals was
their equitable manner of imposing a tax on a shareholder by share-
holder basis rather than the tax imposed by section 356 when a reorgani-
zation is found. Therefore, regardless of the manner in which a reincor-
poration is achieved, three alternative possibilities for taxing the distribu-
210. 96 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1938).
211. Id. at 178.
212. 345 F.2d 35, 41 (4th Cir. 1945).
213. Rev. Rul. 54-518, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 142.
214. See p. 452 supra.
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tion should be available. First, the distribution with respect to this trans-
action may be a dividend pursuant to section 301 or, second, a valid liqui-
dation pursuant to section 331 or, thirdly, a redemption pursuant to sec-
tion 302 or section 346. Since the existing Code would not treat a dis-
tribution in this manner a new Code section, designed specifically for
the reincorporation area, is necessary.
Initially, a specific statute must avoid the pitfalls of the 1954 House
proposal as was done in the proposal of the Subchapter C Advisory
Group. That is, all possible methods available to effectuate this trans-
action must be brought within the ambit of the statutory language. How-
ever, this does not mean that all reincorporations should be treated in
this special manner. For example, if corporation A liquidates and 5
percent of its shareholders reincorporate in corporation B, should the
tax consequences of the statute come into play? It is suggested that
such a transaction should not come within the statute, but rather a con-
tinuity of business and a continuity of shareholder interest test should
be employed to determine when a liquidation-reincorporation should re-
ceive this special treatment. In addition, the statute should specifically
incorporate the constructive attribution rules of section 318 in order to
avoid a possible loophole with regard to the continuity of shareholder
interest. Furthermore, section 381 providing for the carryover of corporate
attributes and section 362 providing for the carryover of basis should
be specifically incorporated by reference. Once the transaction is char-
acterized on the corporate level, then the distribution to the shareholders
must be analyzed and taxed pursuant to either sections 301, 331, or 302
and 346.
Treating a transaction in this manner is not foreign to the Internal
Revenue Code. Section 304 is analogous in that it provides that if two cor-
porations are controlled by one person or persons and if one corporation
purchases the stock of the corporation from those in control, the trans-
action will be treated as a redemption of the stock of the acquiring cor-
poration from the control group. By defining a purchase of stock by
brother-sister corporations from a control person as a redemption, sec-
tion 304 brings into operation section 302. If such a redemption does
not meet the requirements of 302(b) the transaction will not be treated
as an exchange (capital gains) but rather will receive ordinary income
treatment pursuant to section 301. Section 304 then prevents two or more
brother-sister corporations from bailing-out earnings at capital gains rates.
The above format to resolve the liquidation-reincorporation problem is
similar to section 304 both in its purpose and in its imposition of taxes
on a shareholder by shareholder basis. The one difference is that any
statute designed to resolve the liquidation-reincorporation problem must
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